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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the causes and consequences of state 
and federal initiatives to introduce wholesale and retail competition into the U.S. 
electricity sector between 1995 and the present.  Information about the development of 
wholesale market institutions, the expansion of wholesale power trade, the performance 
of wholesale market institutions, the entry of merchant generating capacity, and the 
financial collapse of the trading and merchant generating sector is presented and 
discussed.  Issues regarding the ability of evolving spot wholesale energy market 
institutions and market power mitigation mechanisms to provide adequate incentives for 
investment in new generating capacity in the absence of some form of peak capacity 
obligation are discussed theoretically and evaluated empirically.  The diffusion of retail 
competition and the performance of retail competition programs in eight states is 
examined empirically.  Imperfections in transmission governance arrangements and 
barriers to efficient expansion of the transmission network are identified. The analysis 
leads to the overall conclusion that the development of efficient competitive wholesale 
and retail electricity markets continues to be a work in progress and faces many technical, 
institutional and political challenges in the U.S.  Suggestions for successfully 
confronting, or at least better understanding, these challenges are presented. 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the conference “Electricity Deregulation: Where From Here?” at the Bush Presidential 
Conference Center. Texas A&M University, April 4, 2003.  This draft reflects helpful comments that I 
received from the conference organizers and participants on an earlier version.   I am grateful for financial 
support from the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) and the Cambridge-
MIT Institute (CMI).   
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If deregulation is to play a role in helping to improve the efficiency with which electricity 
is produced and used, it must be introduced as part of a long-term process that also 
encompasses regulatory and structural reform (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, p. 221) 
 
[A]ny deregulation scheme must be carefully structured to conform to the basic 
technological and economic conditions that characterize the supply and demand for 
electricity (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, p. 212) 
 
[T]here is significant uncertainty as to the likelihood of effective competition … in many 
areas of the country.  The key unknown is the impact of transmission capacity constraints 
on the effective extent of geographic markets (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, p.  190) 
 
Electricity restructuring … is likely to involve both costs and benefits.  If the 
restructuring is done right…the benefits … can significantly outweigh the costs.  But the 
jury is still out on whether policymakers have the will to implement the necessary reforms 
effectively (Joskow, 1997, p. 136)  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Academic discussions about the opportunities and challenges associated with 
introducing wholesale and retail competition into the electric power sector have gone on 
for decades.  However, serious considerations of comprehensive electricity sector 
restructuring and deregulation initiatives in the U.S. only began in the mid-1990s, 
following the first comprehensive privatization, restructuring, wholesale and retail 
competition program undertaken in England and Wales (E&W) in 1990. The first 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the conference “Electricity Deregulation: Where From Here?” at the Bush Presidential 
Conference Center. Texas A&M University, April 4, 2003.  This draft reflects helpful comments that I 
received from the conference organizers and participants on an earlier version.   I am grateful for financial 
support from the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) and the Cambridge-
MIT Institute (CMI).   
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comprehensive U.S. programs did not go into operation until early 1998.  Of course, 
wholesale power markets in which proximate vertically integrated utilities traded power 
on a daily and hourly basis subject to very limited regulation, have existed in the U.S. for 
many years.  In addition, during the 1980s the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA) of 1978 stimulated the development of a non-utility power sector selling 
electricity produced primarily from cogeneration facilities and renewable energy facilities 
to local utilities under long-term contracts (Joskow, 1989).  The Energy Policy Act of 
1992 also removed important barriers to the broader development of unregulated non-
utility generating facilities and expanded the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
(FERC) authority to order utilities to provide transmission service to support wholesale 
power transactions. However, these developments largely reflected modest expansions of 
competition at the wholesale level built upon a basic model of regulated vertically 
integrated franchised monopolies.   
The primary impetus for more fundamental restructuring and competition 
initiatives can be traced to electricity policy debates that began in California and a few 
states in the Northeast (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Maine, 
and New Jersey) in the mid-1990s, combined with supporting transmission and wholesale 
market rules and regulations issued by FERC (e.g. Orders 888 and 889) at about the same 
time (Joskow, 2000).   These debates eventually led to regulatory decision and state 
legislation in a number of states to embraced competitive electricity market models. The 
first retail competition programs began operating in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
California in early 1998 and spread to about a dozen states by the end of 2000. By that 
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time about a dozen additional states had announced plans to introduce similar programs 
in the near future.    
The early state restructuring and competition programs included the unbundling 
of the retail supply of generation services from the supply of distribution and 
transmission service and giving retail customers with the opportunity to choose their 
power supplier from among competing retail suppliers.  These programs also included 
various utility restructuring requirements designed to separate (functionally or 
structurally) competitive services (e.g. generation, retail supply) from monopoly services 
(e.g. distribution and transmission) that would continue to be subject to (better) 
regulation, as well as various transition arrangements involving stranded cost recovery, 
generation assets sales, and regulated retail supply services.  These transition 
arrangements typically involved a mandatory reduction of regulated retail prices charged 
to all consumers (or at least residential consumers) and some type of “default” service 
arrangement to supply retail customers with a regulated backstop retail power supply 
option until they migrated to competitive retail suppliers during what was expected to be 
a short transition period.   As the year 2000 began it appeared that these types of 
competitive electricity sector reforms would sweep the country within a few years as a 
growing number of states jumped on the bandwagon.  There was also a serious prospect 
that supporting federal legislation would be enacted by Congress to remove remaining 
legal and policy barriers to effective wholesale and retail competition and to harmonize 
diverse state policies.   
Since the year 2000, however, no additional states have announced plans to 
introduce competitive reforms of this type and about nine states that had planned to 
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implement reforms have delayed, cancelled or significantly scaled back their electricity 
competition programs.  Federal pro-competition electricity legislation has also been 
stalled.  The California electricity crisis of 2000-2001 (Joskow 2001), Enron’s 
bankruptcy, the financial collapse of many merchant generating and trading companies, 
volatile wholesale market prices, rising real retail prices in some states, phantom trading 
and fraudulent price reporting revelations, accounting abuses, a declining number of 
competitive retail supply options for residential and small commercial customers in many 
states, and continuing allegations of market power and market abuses in wholesale 
markets have all helped to take the glow off of electricity “deregulation” in many parts of 
the U.S.  The average real retail price of electricity in the U.S. increased for the first time 
in 15 years in 2000 for industrial customers and in 2001 for residential customers (Figure 
1), though preliminary data indicate that real prices fell in 2002.  FERC has found itself at 
war with many states in the Southeast and the West as they resist its efforts to expand 
institutions it believes are necessary to support efficient competitive wholesale markets in 
all regions of the country.  In response to the resulting political pressure, in a White Paper 
issued on April 28, 2003, FERC indicated that it would provide states and regions with 
more time and flexibility to implement the wholesale market reforms --- the Standard 
Market Design (SMD) ---  that it proposed in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) 
issued in August 2002. 
At the very least, the pace of wholesale and retail competition and the supporting 
restructuring and regulatory reforms has slowed considerably since 2000.  Many states 
have concluded that these types of electricity sector reforms are not in the interest of 
consumers in their states, or that it is prudent to wait to see if policymakers can figure out 
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how to make competition work well and can demonstrate that these reforms will bring 
long term benefits for consumers.  At the same time, most of the states in the Northeast, a 
few in the Midwest, Texas, and FERC are committed to moving forward with the 
development of competitive wholesale and retail markets and to making them work well. 
In this paper, I will discuss what has gone right, what has gone wrong and the 
lessons learned from the experience with wholesale and retail competition in the U.S. 
during the last five years. My focus is selective rather than comprehensive, reflecting my 
own interests and assessment of what aspects of the reform program are most important 
to understand and where improvements are needed.  Since California has attracted so 
much attention by industry analysts, the media, and policymakers, this paper will say 
little about California and focus on developments in the rest of the country.2 
 
WHY WHOLESALE AND RETAIL COMPETITION? 
 
 Background 
 
 Electricity sectors almost everywhere on earth evolved with (primarily) vertically 
integrated geographic monopolies that were either publicly owned or subject to public 
regulation of prices, service obligations, major investments, financing, and expansion into 
unregulated lines of business.  That is, the primary components of electricity supply --- 
generation, transmission, distribution, and retail supply --- were integrated within 
individual electric utilities.  These firms in turn had de facto exclusive franchises to 
supply residential, commercial and industrial consumers within a defined geographic 
area.  The performance of these regulated monopolies varied widely across countries and 
between utilities in the U.S.  While there is much to criticize about the institution of 
                                                 
2 My views on the causes of the California electricity crisis can be found in Joskow (2001) and my analysis 
of price formation and market power during the summer of 2000 in Joskow and Kahn (2002). 
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regulated monopoly, it is a mistake to assume that the performance of the U.S. electric 
power industry during the 20th century was extremely poor.  The electric power sector in 
the U.S. had a very high rate of productivity growth from 1900 to 1970 and it’s 
performance compared very favorably to international norms regarding labor 
productivity, production costs, penetration rates, reliability and prices.  Serious problems 
began to emerge during the 1970s and 1980s as fossil fuel prices rose, inflation and 
interest rates rose, nuclear power plant costs exploded and some states embraced PURPA 
with excessive and costly enthusiasm (Joskow 1974, 1989).  Real retail electricity prices 
rose significantly in many states during the 1970s and early 1980s for the first time in the 
history of commercial electric power.  Moreover, it became clear that there were 
significant variations in performance across utilities, but an industry structure which 
provided limited opportunities for more efficient suppliers to expand and to place 
pressure on less efficient suppliers to improve or contract.   
On a national (average) level, real retail electricity prices began to fall once again 
after the mid-1980s, and continued to fall until 2000-2001, as fossil fuel prices and 
interest rates declined and inflation moderated significantly.  Nevertheless, the legacy of 
costly nuclear investment and long-term contracting decisions made during the 1970s and 
1980s continued to be reflected in regulated retail prices during the 1990s in those states 
that had made major commitments to these resources (e.g. California, New York, New 
England).  While on average real retail electricity prices fell after 1985, in the Northeast, 
California and a few other states real retail prices continued to rise into the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as legacy costs of nuclear plants and QF contracts, combined with excess 
generating capacity, continued to be reflected in regulated retail prices.  Moreover, large 
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disparities emerged between regulated retail electricity prices in different states and 
regions and between the embedded cost of electric generation services used to set 
regulated retail prices and the apparent market value of electric generation services in the 
regional wholesale power markets.  In the Northeast, California, Illinois and a few other 
states, a large gap appeared to exist between the regulated price of generation service and 
the wholesale market value of these services.  Industrial customers began to view 
regulated utilities as representing a barrier to obtaining lower-priced power available in 
wholesale markets.  From the regulated utilities’ perspective, the “gap” between 
regulated generation prices and competitive generation prices indicated the potentially 
“stranded costs” that utility investors would incur if generation service prices dropped 
from their regulated levels, reflecting historical capital costs of generating facilities and 
long-term contractual commitments to buy power from PURPA Qualifying Facilities, to 
reflect their current wholesale market values.  
 Three things are worth noting about this gap between the generation component 
of regulated retail prices and wholesale market values.  First, it largely (though not 
entirely) reflected sunk costs associated with historical investment and long-term 
contracting decisions.   Second, the size of the gap varied widely from region to region 
and utility to utility. In several areas of the country the gap was negative --- i.e. regulated 
generation prices were below their wholesale market value.  Third, wholesale market 
prices observed in the early 1990s were a misleading indicator of what wholesale prices 
would be in the long run in an industry where generation services were sold largely 
through market mechanisms rather than through vertical integration.  The wholesale 
markets in the early 1990s were largely short- term “excess energy” markets in which 
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utilities with capacity in excess of their retail customers’ needs could sell it to 
neighboring utilities that had generating capacity with higher short-run marginal cost 
which could be displaced by lower cost energy purchased in the wholesale market.  There 
was excess generating capacity overall in most areas of the country and the operating 
costs of a vertically integrated utility’s own generation placed a natural cap on wholesale 
market prices.   
 Initial interest in electricity sector reform started in the states with the highest 
retail electricity prices and where the apparent gaps between wholesale and retail prices 
were the largest.  They included California, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, 
New Jersey, Maine and Pennsylvania.  As discussed elsewhere (White, Joskow (2000)), 
the political pressures for reforms in these states, and in particular for retail competition, 
came from lobbying activities by industrial customers, independent power producers, and 
would-be electricity marketers with experience in the natural gas industry.  Enron played 
a major role in stimulating interest in restructuring and competition in almost every one 
of these “pioneer” states.  The primary selling point to state regulators and legislators was 
that by introducing competition, retail prices would fall significantly to reflect the lower 
priced power available in the wholesale market.  Incumbent utilities in these states 
initially opposed these retail competition proposals due to the potential for stranding sunk 
costs, but ultimately negotiated settlements that provided for recovery of a significant 
fraction of these sunk costs.  How retail prices could both fall dramatically to reflect 
lower wholesale prices and utilities could recover their stranded costs (roughly the 
difference between regulated generation prices and the expected wholesale price of 
electricity) was a bit of questionable arithmetic that was largely glossed over. 
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 Public Interest Goals 
 
 While, the political debates at the state level focused on retail price reductions, 
stranded cost recovery, and the creation of opportunities for incumbents and hungry new 
entrants, the intellectual debates focused on a broader set of public interest goals and 
implementation strategies.  I think that there is fairly wide agreement about the goals that 
electricity sector reforms should achieve and even on the basic architecture of a model for 
creating competitive wholesale and retail markets to achieve these goals.  It is less clear 
that there was broad understanding of what would have to be done to achieve these goals 
and how long it would take to achieve them. 
 The overriding reform goal is to create new governance arrangements for the 
electricity sector that will provide long-term benefits to consumers.  Theses benefits will 
accrue by relying on competitive wholesale markets for power to provide better 
incentives for controlling capital and operating costs of new and existing generating 
capacity, to encourage innovation in power supply technologies, and to shift the risks of 
technology choice, construction cost and operating “mistakes” to suppliers and away 
from consumers.  Retail competition, or “customer choice” would allow consumers to 
choose the supplier offering the price/service quality combination that best met their 
needs, and competing retail suppliers would provide an enhanced array of retail service 
products, risk management, demand management, and new opportunities for service 
quality differentiation based on individual consumer preferences. 
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It was also widely recognized that significant portions of the total costs of 
electricity supply --- distribution and transmission --- would continue to be regulated. 
Accordingly, reform to traditional regulatory arrangements governing the distribution and 
transmission networks have generally been viewed as an important complement to the 
introduction of wholesale and retail competition to supply consumer energy needs.   This 
is the case for at least two reasons.  First, regulatory mechanisms with good incentive 
properties would lead to lower distribution and transmission costs and this is turn would 
help to reduce retail electricity prices.  During the first decade of the electricity 
restructuring and competition program in England and Wales, as much as 35% of the 
reduction in real electricity prices was associated with cost reductions in distribution and 
transmission.  Second, the efficiency of wholesale markets in particular depends on a 
well functioning supporting transmission network and its efficient operation by a system 
operator.  Good operating and investments incentives are important for providing an 
efficient network platform upon which wholesale and retail competition would proceed.  
In the long run, the promise was that these reforms would lead to lower costs and 
lower average retail price levels reflecting these cost savings compared to regulated 
monopoly alternative, while maintaining or enhancing system reliability and achieving 
environmental improvement goals.  Anyway, this was the dream. 
 
 The Basic Model for Competitive Wholesale and Retail Markets 
 
 Whatever the political motivations, the basic architecture for transitioning to 
competitive electricity markets had already been developed in theory and applied in 
practice in other countries (e.g. England and Wales, Norway, Argentina).  It involves 
several key components that are depicted in Figure 2: 
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a. Vertical separation of competitive segments (e.g. generation, marketing and 
retail supply) from regulated segments (distribution, transmission, system 
operations) either structurally (through divestiture) or functionally (with 
internal “Chinese” walls separating affiliates within the same corporation). 
 
b. Horizontal integration of transmission and network operations to encompass 
the geographic expanse of “natural” wholesale markets and the designation of 
a single independent system operator to manage the operation the network, to 
schedule generation to meet demand and to maintain the physical parameters 
of the network (frequency, voltage, stability) so that the lights would stay on 
except under extremely rare conditions. 
 
c. The creation of wholesale spot energy and operating reserve market 
institutions to support requirements for real time balancing, to respond 
quickly6 and effectively to unplanned outages of transmission or generating 
facilities consistent with the need to maintain network voltage, frequency and 
stability parameters within narrow limits, and to facilitate economical trading 
opportunities among suppliers and between buyers and sellers. 
 
d. Creation of institutions to facilitate access to the transmission network by 
buyers and sellers to facilitate economical production and exchange, 
including mechanisms efficiently to allocate scarce transmission capacity. 
 
e. Horizontal restructuring, forward supply commitments and/or behavioral 
rules to mitigate regional and localized market power in wholesale markets. 
 
f. Unbundling retail tariffs to separate retail power supplies and associated 
support services to be supplied competitively from distribution and 
transmission services that would continue to be provided by regulated 
monopolies. 
 
g. Requiring retail consumers to purchase their power supplies from competing 
retail suppliers which in turn buy their power in wholesale markets, or own 
generating facilities to support their retail supply commitments. 
 
This is the basic architecture, but if we have learned anything in the last several 
years of U.S. and international experience, the devil is in the details of actual 
implementation in practice.   
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UNDERESTIMATING THE RESTRUCTURING CHALLENGE 
 
 In the U.S., electricity sector restructuring and competition initiatives got off on 
the wrong foot in many parts of the country at least in part because policymakers and 
many of their advisers underestimated the nature and magnitude of the technical and 
institutional challenges associated with successfully introducing competitive wholesale 
and retail markets and the uncertainties associated with how best to respond to these 
challenges.  To some extent the underestimation of the magnitude and extent of the 
challenge was strategic, reflecting efforts by some participants in the process to feather 
their own nests.  However, it also reflected a combination of ignorance, political barriers, 
and true uncertainty about how best to restructure to support competition and how to 
design effective wholesale and retail market, transmission, and system operations 
institutions.  The experts did not, and in many areas still do not, agree on exactly how 
best to proceed with these structural and institutional reforms.  This situation reinforced 
the natural inclination of policymakers to treat the details of the restructuring program as 
a political rather than a technical problem.  This in turn resulted in numerous political 
compromises over restructuring and market design issues and the mixing and matching of 
pieces of alternative restructuring models that did not fit very well together. 
 Why is the transformation of a regulated monopoly electric power industry into 
one that relies on competition to supply power at the wholesale and retail levels so 
challenging?  There are several sets of reasons.  First, electricity has an unusual set of 
physical and economic attributes that significantly complicate the task of replacing 
hierarchies (vertical integration and multilateral agreements) with decentralized market 
mechanisms.  These attributes include: 
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a. Electricity cannot be stored economically and demand must be cleared with “just-
in-time” production from generating capacity available to the network at (almost) 
exactly the same time that the electricity is consumed. 
 
b. Physical laws governing electricity network operations in real time to maintain 
frequency, voltage and stability of the network, along with network congestion, 
interact with non-storability to require that supply and demand be cleared 
continuously at every location on the network.  Creating a set of complete markets 
that operate this quickly, at so many locations, and without creating market power 
problems is a significant challenge. 
 
c. The short-run demand elasticity for electricity is very low and supply gets very 
inelastic at high demand levels as capacity constraints are approached. As a result, 
spot electricity prices are inherently very volatile and unusually susceptible to the 
creation of opportunities for suppliers to exercise market power unilaterally.  
 
d. Network congestion, combined with non-storability, may limit significantly the 
geographic expanse of competition by constraining the ability of remote suppliers 
to compete, further enhancing market power problems.  
 
e. Loop flow, resulting from the physics of power flows on AC networks, introduces 
additional complex interactions between generators at different points on the 
network, creating unusual opportunities for suppliers to take actions unilaterally 
to affect market prices, complicating the definition of property rights, and creating 
coordination and free riding problems when, as in the Eastern and Western 
networks in the U.S., there are multiple system operators responsible for 
interconnected portions of a single synchronized AC network.  
 
f. Electricity demand varies widely from season to season, between day and night, 
with extreme temperatures, and between weekdays and weekends (and holidays).  
The difference between the peak demand and the lowest demand over the course 
of a year is a factor of about three. Because electricity cannot be stored and varies 
widely over the year, a significant amount of the generating capacity connected to 
the system operates for a relatively small number of hours during the year to meet 
peak demands.  Historically, there has also been little reliance on real time prices 
to ration peak demands.  This means that the ability of generators that provide 
services for a small fraction of the year to recover their investment and fixed 
operating and maintenance costs is heavily dependant on the price formation 
process during periods when demand (and prices) are at their highest levels. 
 
g. The combination of non-storability, real time variations in demand, low demand 
elasticity, random real time failures of generation and transmission equipment, the 
need to continuously clear supply and demand at every point on the network to 
meet the physical constraints on reliable network operations, means that some 
source of real time “inventory” is required to keep the system in balance.  This 
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“inventory” is generally provided by “standby” generators that can respond very 
quickly to changing supply and demand conditions, though demand side 
responses can also theoretically provide equivalent services as well.  Compatible 
market mechanisms for procuring and effectively operating these “ancillary 
services” are therefore necessary.  Designing well functioning integrated markets 
for energy to meet demand and the need for multiple ancillary services to 
maintain network reliability consistent with all of the other constraints and 
attributes enumerated above is very challenging.   
 
h. The performance of competitive markets for electricity depend critically on the 
way the regulated transmission network is operated, access to it priced, and scarce 
transmission capacity is allocated.  There are important complementarities 
between energy markets and transmission operations, especially congestion 
management and responses to emergencies.  Integrating spot energy and ancillary 
services markets with the allocation of scarce transmission capacity is necessary 
to wholesale power markets to operate efficiently. 
 
While there are many competitive industries that have one or perhaps two of these 
attributes, it is hard to think of any commodity market that has all of them.3  Moreover, it 
is precisely these attributes of electricity that led to vertical integration between 
generation and transmission and either to extensive horizontal integration or to 
multilateral cooperative agreements between neighboring vertically integrated system 
operators.  Ignoring these unusual attributes of electricity, and ignoring how and why 
historical governance arrangements evolved for dealing with them (Joskow, 1997, 2002), 
is a very bad mistake.  Replacing these hierarchical governance arrangements with well 
functioning decentralized market mechanisms is a very significant technical challenge, 
about which even the best experts have disagreements.  Accordingly, it should not be 
surprising that electricity restructuring and competition programs have inevitably been a 
                                                 
3 So, for example, hotel rooms are non-storable.  An empty room cannot be stored for another day.  
However, the demand for hotel rooms is likely to be quite elastic, “stockouts” frequently occur when 
demand is high, average utilization factors are 80-90%, one hotel cannot affect the supply of rooms at 
another hotel in the city by closing down several rooms, and we do not expect hotels to rent all of their 
rooms at a uniform price equal to the hotel’s short run marginal cost. 
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process that involves a lot of learning by doing and ongoing changes to market rules, 
regulatory arrangements, and governance institutions.   
These technical challenges have been further complicated in the U.S. by a number of 
institutional, legacy investment and political factors that many other countries have been 
able to avoid.  First, the U.S. industry has been characterized by an unusually large 
number of private vertically integrated utilities of widely varying sizes that own and 
control generation, transmission, and distribution facilities in or near their distribution 
franchise areas.  Many of these vertically integrated utilities are control area operators 
(about 140 in 1995) that were, and in many cases still are, responsible for operating 
portions of one of the three synchronized AC networks in the U.S., subject to rules 
established by the regional reliability councils and a variety of bilateral and multilateral 
operating agreements.  Only in the Northeast did multi-utility power pools emerge to 
centrally dispatch generation resources and manage the operation of transmission 
networks with different owners of individual pieces. 
This legacy industry structure is not conducive to creating well functioning 
competitive wholesale and retail markets (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983).  Ideally, a 
restructuring program would have separated competitive generation and marketing 
functions from regulated transmission and distribution activities.  Generation ownership 
would have been further decentralized if ownership concentration created significant 
additional market power problems.  Horizontal integration of transmission assets would 
have taken place to create regional transmission companies to own and operate 
transmission networks spanning large geographic areas.  This was the basic approach of 
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the restructuring programs in England and Wales, Spain, Norway, Argentina, Australia, 
and Alberta. 
Third, the electric power industry in the U.S. has historically been regulated primarily 
by the states.  The states have divergent views about the desirability of transitioning to 
competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets and restructuring the utilities in their 
states to do so effectively.  Unlike most other countries that have gone down this path, the 
U.S. has no clear and coherent national laws that adopt a competitive wholesale and retail 
market model as national policy and that give federal authorities the tools to do the 
necessary restructuring and market design work required to make it work.  Congress has 
passed no legislation mandating the implementation of a comprehensive wholesale and 
retail competition model for the electricity sector.  Instead the U.S. has relied heavily on 
individual state initiatives and efforts by FERC to use its existing but limited Federal 
Power Act authority to cajole and encourage the states and their utilities to create 
competitive wholesale markets and supporting transmission institutions.  It is hard to 
force states to adopt policies they don’t like, especially when the regulated utilities in 
these states don’t like them either.  It is also difficult to force private firms to divest assets 
and restructure vertically and horizontally without providing them with financial 
incentives to do so.  In most other countries, the restructuring program was implemented 
in conjunction with the privatization of state-owned assets so that they did not have to 
confront issues associated with government takings of private property.   As a result, to 
make progress, FERC has had to rely on a variety of alternative regulatory and 
institutional arrangements, and various regulatory carrots and sticks to provide incentives 
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for cooperation, in order to compensate for its inability to require the kind of 
restructuring program that can most effectively support wholesale and retail competition.  
Fourth, the combination of many relatively small vertically integrated utilities, many 
operating small control areas, combined with state regulation, has had the effect 
historically of limiting investments in transmission capacity that provides strong linkages 
between generating facilities over large geographic areas.  So, for example, New England 
has only 1500 Mw of transmission capacity connecting this six-state region with the rest 
of the United States.  The Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and  
Washington, D.C. area, where the major utilities have participated in a power pool (PJM) 
since the 1920s, has a strong internal transmission network, but only about 3500 Mw of 
firm simultaneous transmission capacity with neighboring states.  Moreover, the 
configuration of the control areas’ internal networks typically reflected a century of 
evolution of the utilities that began supplying electricity early in the 20th century, with 
generating plants first located in or near load centers and then gradually expanding as 
more remote generating sites became necessary to accommodate larger generating 
stations.  Interconnections with neighboring utilities were built primarily for reliability 
purposes rather to gain access to lower cost power supplies located remotely from the 
local utility’s franchise area.  In addition, there was no need for these transmission 
investments to take account of the potential market power problems caused by 
transmission constraints.  The legacy transmission networks therefore represent a 
potentially serious constraint on effective competition when wholesale power markets are 
deregulated due to the resulting limitations on the geographic expanse of wholesale 
power markets (Joskow and Schmalensee, 2003). 
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These institutional, legacy investment, and political realities have significantly 
complicated the kind of industry restructuring that is necessary for effective 
implementation of what is already the very significant technical challenge of creating 
well functioning competitive wholesale and retail markets for electricity.  They continue 
to be a barrier to effective national reforms today. 
 
GENERATION RESTRUCTURING AND MERCHANT GENERATION 
INVESTMENT 
 
The approaches to restructuring to support wholesale and retail competition have 
varied widely across the states.  States that have implemented retail competition 
programs have also typically strongly encouraged or required the affected utilities to 
separate their regulated T&D businesses from their wholesale generation and marketing 
activities.  The first few states to implement retail competition programs also 
(effectively)4 required their utilities to divest substantially all of their generating capacity 
through an auction process (e.g. California, Massachusetts, New York, Maine, Rhode 
Island).  Other states that have implemented retail competition programs permitted the 
utilities under their jurisdiction to retain the bulk of their generating assets and to move 
them into separate unregulated wholesale power affiliates within a holding company 
structure (e.g. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio, Texas, New Jersey).  (A few 
utilities in these states chose voluntarily to divest their generating assets anyway.)  
Whether the generating assets were divested or transferred to affiliates, the utilities 
affected typically retained some type of transition or “default service” obligation to 
continue to supply retail customers who had not chosen a competitive retail supplier 
                                                 
4 Otherwise the magnitude and speed of stranded cost recovery was threatened. 
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(ESP) at prices determined through some type of regulatory transition “contract.”  The 
terms, conditions and durations of these obligations vary widely from state to state and 
sometimes vary significantly among utilities in the same state (e.g. New York).  I will 
discuss default service obligations further below when I discuss the evolution of retail 
competition.   
Table 1 displays the patterns of the migration of utility generating assets from 
regulated utility to unregulated “non-utility” status5 through either divestiture to third 
parties or through transfers of generating assets to affiliates of the legacy regulated utility 
owners.  It is evident from the data in Table 1 that generation restructuring activity 
peaked in 1999-2000 and that the initial focus on divestiture of generating assets was 
replaced by generating asset transfers to affiliates of the regulated utilities within a 
holding company structure.  The latter holding companies still have common ownership 
of generation, marketing, retail supply, distribution and transmission and from this 
perspective continue to be vertically integrated.  However, FERC and state regulations 
place restrictions on communications between utilities owning and operating 
transmission and distribution assets and those owning and operating unregulated 
generating plants, wholesale marketing and retail supply businesses.  Generation 
restructuring of either form now appears to have largely been halted as a result of no 
additional state retail competition and restructuring programs being implemented after the 
California electricity crisis. 
During the last few years there has also been a significant amount of entry of new 
unregulated generating capacity seeking to supply power to both unintegrated distribution 
                                                 
5 Typically becoming Electric Wholesale Generating (EWG) companies as provided for in the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992. 
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companies and to vertically integrated utilities that have been encouraged or required by 
state regulators to meet their incremental generation needs through wholesale market 
purchases.  Table 2 displays the patterns of entry of new generating capacity between 
1997 and 2002.   About 80% of this new generating capacity is unregulated “merchant” 
or “non-utility” capacity built to make sales in competitive wholesale markets.  Very little 
new generating capacity was added anywhere in the U.S. during the mid-1990s, 
reflecting the perception that there was excess generating capacity in most regions of the 
country and uncertainties about the direction of restructuring and competition policies at 
the state and federal levels.  As FERC issued new regulations governing transmission 
access and related wholesale market rules, as a growing number of states adopted retail 
competition programs, and as wholesale power prices rose, a large number of merchant 
plants were announced, began to seek construction permits, went into construction and 
were ultimately completed.  By 2002, the amount of generating capacity completed 
reached 55,000 Mw per year, an order of magnitude greater than in 1997 and 1998 and a 
in total of nearly 140,000Mw of new generating capacity was completed between 1999 
and 2002.6  Most of this capacity is gas-fired and relies on clean and thermally efficient 
combined-cycle generating technology.  Up to roughly the middle of 2001, investments 
in new merchant generating projects and trading power in wholesale markets was 
perceived to be a booming business with enormous profit opportunities and was pointed 
to as a notable success of policies aimed at stimulating competition in electricity.  
However, as I shall discuss in more detail presently, the boom has now turned into a bust 
with abundant generating capacity in service in almost all regions of the country, a 
merchant generating and trading sector in difficult financial shape, and many planned 
                                                 
6 The U.S. has about 760,000 Mw of generating capacity in 1995.  
 21
new generating plants (even some under construction) being cancelled or indefinitely 
postponed. 
The combination of divestiture of existing generating plants by utilities, transfers 
of utility generating plants to unregulated utility affiliates, and entry of new merchant 
generating plants (a significant amount of which is owned by utility affiliates), has led to 
a large increase in the fraction of electricity generating by unregulated “non-utility” 
generating plants.   Table 3 displays the fraction of total electricity supplied in the U.S. 
that has been accounted for by unregulated “non-utility” power suppliers between 1990 
and 2002.7  By 2002 unregulated generators were producing about 33% of the total 
electricity supplied in the U.S.  If we deduct generation supplied by municipal utilities, 
federal power projects, and cooperatives, unregulated private power generation now 
accounts for about 40% of the energy supplied by investor-owned companies.  However, 
a significant fraction of this energy comes from generating plants held by affiliates of 
vertically integrated utilities and located in the same areas as their distribution and 
transmission facilities.   
All things considered, there has been a very significant restructuring of the 
generating segment of the electric power industry in the last few years.  However, there 
are significant uncertainties about how quickly the pace of generation restructuring will 
be in the future. 
 
a. Since Texas, no additional states have adopted and implemented retail 
competition and industry restructuring programs.  There does not appear to be a 
lot of enthusiasm in the remaining states to implement such reforms quickly or at 
all.  These states are likely to continue to require or provide incentives for their 
vertically integrated utilities to look to the wholesale market for their incremental 
                                                 
7 In 1990, virtually all of the non-utility generation was accounted for be cogenerators, industrial plants, 
and renewable energy facilities. 
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power supply needs, but there is an emerging trend toward utilities again looking 
to build regulated generating plants to serve their native load customers.  While 
FERC has continued to push reforms to wholesale market and transmission 
institutions (more on this below), there has been growing resistance from many 
states to pro-competition policies. 
 
b. The merchant generating sector is in terrible financial shape.  What had been an 
enormous boom has now turned into an enormous bust.  Table 4 displays the 
market values of a share of common stock for each of eleven companies with 
major financial commitments to energy trading and merchant generating capacity 
in May 2001 (peak week) and on March 10, 2003.  The equity values of these 
companies has fallen dramatically in less than two years and only two of these 
companies (both with large regulated utility affiliates) now have investment grade 
credit ratings.  About 125,000 Mw of new power projects that had been 
announced prior to 2001 have now been cancelled or indefinitely suspended in the 
last two years.  A significant amount of additional capacity under construction or 
in the permitting process has been delayed.   
 
The fact that many announced projects have now been cancelled is not surprising.  
Many more generating projects were announced than could possibly have been absorbed 
profitably by the market. As new generating capacity was completed and demand slowed 
with the slowdown in the economy, wholesale market prices softened and it became clear 
that many regions would have capacity surpluses in the immediate future. The market 
responding to these price signals with reductions and delays in investment in new 
capacity is what we should expect in a competitive market.  However, the slowdown 
appears to be more than simply an ordinary market response to changes in supply and 
demand. The merchant generating and trading sector benefited from a “financial bubble” 
similar to the one supporting telecom and internet stocks, giving them easy access to 
cheap capital to finance new generating capacity without support from longer term 
contracts, as well as large energy trading operations that expanded well beyond trading 
around their own assets into highly speculative trading activities.  The end of the stock 
market bubble, a better understanding by investors of the real economics and market risks 
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associated with building merchant generating plants and trading commodity electricity, 
trading and accounting improprieties, credit downgrades, refinancing problems, and 
uncertainties about the future direction of industry restructuring, wholesale market rules, 
and retail competition, have decimated the merchant generating and trading sector, 
slashing investment and trading activity and dramatically increasing the cost of capital for 
new generating plants and very significantly reducing liquidity in forward electricity 
markets.  Changes in capital market conditions and imperfections in wholesale market 
institutions are likely to create barriers to stimulating efficient investment in new 
generating capacity and efficient retirement decisions of existing generating capacity in 
the near future, a subject that I will return to in the section on “resource adequacy” below.  
Despite all of the restructuring that has taken place, overall, the U.S. electric power 
industry continues with a substantial amount of vertical integration between competitive 
segments and regulated segments in the same geographic area. A majority of the states 
have decided against pushing forward with competitive market and restructuring 
initiatives, at least for the time being.  In addition, transmission ownership and system 
operations continue to be very fragmented with ongoing barriers to the development of 
regional wholesale markets.  Transmission network congestion has continued to increase.  
FERC has recognized and tried to respond to the problems that arise when transmission 
owners are not independent of the market participants that rely on the network, to 
problems of excessive fragmentation, and wholesale market inefficiencies.  I turn to 
developments in these areas in the sections below. 
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WHOLESALE SPOT MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
 One of the most challenging things to explain to people who are not familiar with 
the unusual attributes of electricity is that wholesale electricity markets do not design 
themselves but must be designed as an integral central component of a successful  
electricity restructuring and competition program.  Unlike England and Wales, Norway, 
Sweden, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and most other countries, the U.S. did 
not proceed with its wholesale and retail competition initiatives with a clear coherent 
blueprint for wholesale market design, transmission institutions, or vertical and horizontal 
restructuring. Moreover, despite experience in other countries, the U.S. did not take 
adequate account of wholesale market imperfections and the incentives and opportunities 
created by market imperfections for individual suppliers to engage in bidding, 
scheduling, and trading practices that could increase prices above competitive levels and 
harm consumers (the distinction that some have drawn between “market power” and 
“exploiting market inefficiencies” to the same end, is in my view, meaningless). 
 FERC’s efforts to reform wholesale market institutions began with Orders 888 
and 889 in 1996.  These orders basically established rules under which jurisdictional 
transmission owners were required to provide access to their transmission systems to 
third parties, and associated requirements to provide balancing and operating reserve 
services using formulas or procurement methods specified in FERC regulated 
transmission tariffs, to make information about the availability of transmission service, 
purchasing, and scheduling transmission capacity easily available to all market 
participants.  However, Order 888’s basic regulatory framework presumed that the 
prevailing structure of the electric power industry would remain largely unchanged, 
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followed traditional utility transmission practices regarding the provision of transmission 
service to third parties.  These practices were based on utility-specific “contract paths” 
that were often inconsistent with actual power flows and average “postage stamp” 
embedded cost transmission price ceilings.8  Order 888 also gave the incumbents first 
refusal on available transmission capacity (they had paid for it after all), and relied on 
administrative rationing, rather than economic rationing, to allocate transmission 
constraints.  Order 888 did not require utilities to operate transparent organized day-
ahead or real time markets for energy or operating reserves but rather required 
transmission owners to provide balancing services and operating reserves as cost-based 
prices. The transmission owners administering the Order 888 tariffs generally owned 
generating capacity and used the same network to buy and sell wholesale power as did 
their would be competitors. 
 The three Northeastern power pools, California, Texas, and, most recently, 
several Midwestern states (Midwest ISO), took a more comprehensive approach to 
developing new wholesale market institutions.  They created independent system 
operators (ISOs) to schedule and dispatch generation and demand on transmission 
networks with multiple owners, to allocate scarce transmission capacity, to develop and 
apply fair interconnection procedures for new generators, to operate voluntary public 
real-time and (sometimes) day-ahead markets for energy and ancillary services, to 
coordinate planning for new transmission facilities, to monitor market performance in 
cooperation with independent market monitors, and to implement mitigation measures 
                                                 
8 Unlike a First Class postage stamp which allows one to send a letter to anywhere in the U.S. for 37 cents, 
“postage stamp” transmission tariffs only provide for transit to or through an individual utility’s 
transmission network.   The number of postage stamps required for transmission service depended upon 
how many utilities with transmission facilities happen to be on the contract path available between an 
injection point and a delivery point.  This phenomenon is known as “pancaking.”  
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and market reforms when performance problems emerged.  FERC’s proposed Standard 
Market Design Rules (SMD) would extend what it views as the best practices drawn from 
the experience with these ISOs to the rest of the country.  However, at the present time, 
the U.S. has a patchwork of different wholesale market institutions operating in different 
regions of the country.  Moving power between portions of the networks operated by 
different system operators is sometimes difficult or costly and coordination imperfections 
between control area operators increase costs of energy, operating reserves, and 
congestion especially during emergency conditions. 
 The debates over the design of these wholesale market institutions in California in 
1996 and 1997 got the reforms off on the wrong foot.  These debates were contentious 
and highly politicized, reflecting perceptions by various interest groups about how 
different wholesale market institutions would advance or constrain their interests and, in 
my view, an inadequate amount of humility regarding uncertainties about the 
performance attributes of different institutional arrangements.  The discussion of 
alternative institutions was polluted by an unfortunate overtone of ideological rhetoric 
that attempted to characterize the debate about wholesale market institutions as one 
between “central planners” and “free market” advocates (Joskow, 1996).  The market 
design process in California in 1997 and 1998 also demonstrates how market design by 
committee, reflecting interest group compromises and mixing and matching pieces of 
different market models, can lead to a system with the worst attributes of all of them 
(Joskow 2001). 
 There have been a number of studies of the performance of the wholesale market 
institutions performed by market monitors, consultants, and academics that have been 
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created over the last several years.  Let me summarize what I believe we have learned 
from the experience of the last several years. 
 
a. All wholesale market designs work reasonably well in the short run when 
demand is low or moderate, supply is very elastic and generating resource 
ownership not too highly concentrated, there is little congestion on the 
transmission network, and barriers to scheduling power by competing 
generators are removed with reasonable transmission access and energy 
balancing procedures and prices.  The performance challenges for wholesale 
market institutions arise during the relatively small number of hours each year 
when demand is high, supply is inelastic, transmission congestion is 
significant and widely dispersed.  The performance of wholesale market 
institutions under these conditions is very important because this is when 
markets have to work hard to facilitate an efficient allocation of scarce 
resources. It is during these hours when competitive market prices should be 
high, when congestion is likely to lead to significantly different prices at 
different locations on the network, when a significant fraction of competitive 
market “rents” are produced to pay for the capital costs of investments in new 
generating capacity, when demand-side decisions are most important for 
providing investors with accurate price signals reflecting consumer 
preferences for investment in “reserve capacity” and reliability and for 
signaling consumer demand for risk hedging instruments to financial 
intermediaries.   
 
Unfortunately, it is also under these “tight supply” conditions when market 
power problems are most serious, when system operator discretion is most 
important, and when non-price rationing to balance supply and demand to 
maintain the network’s physical parameters within acceptable levels are most 
likely to be necessary because incomplete markets cannot respond fast enough 
to rapidly changing system conditions that threaten network reliability.  Price 
formation during these relatively few hours each year works its way through 
the system to affect forward prices, incentives for investment in new 
generating capacity and retirement decisions about existing generating 
capacity, and overall system reliability.  In the end, the performance of 
wholesale market institutions should be judged primarily by how they 
function during these tight supply conditions. 
 
b. The debate about whether wholesale markets should be organized around 
“bilateral contracts” or “centralized dispatch” that took place in California in 
1996 and 1997 was an empty and unnecessarily confusing debate.  Bilateral 
financial contracts and self-scheduling and dispatch of generators and load can 
and should be an important component of any wholesale market design.  
Nevertheless, there is an important role for the single system operator 
responsible for maintaining the necessary physical parameters of the network 
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and facilitating economical decisions by buyers and sellers of energy and 
ancillary services.  This role includes operating voluntary, consistent, and 
transparent real-time balancing and (ideally) day-ahead scheduling bid-based 
auction markets that are cleared by the system operator using a security-
constrained dispatch algorithm that incorporates, as accurately as possible, the 
physical topology of the network (Hogan 1992, 1993).  This process 
necessarily will yield shadow prices at each supply and demand node 
reflecting network constraints.  The difference between the nodal prices at any 
point A and at any other point B on the network (ignoring losses) is a measure 
of the costs of congestion associated with an incremental injection of 
generation at node A and an incremental increase in demand at node B.  At 
least in the real time balancing market, these are the proper prices to be used 
for settlement purposes for net sales and purchases of energy (deviations from 
day-ahead schedules) and pricing of congestion.  Aggregation to larger zones 
on the supply side is, in my view, potentially problematic (and unnecessary) 
while aggregation on the demand side is probably not a big problem for 
groups of customers that unlikely to be subject to real time metering and 
pricing anyway. 
 
c. The allocation of scarce transmission capacity day-ahead and in real-time 
should be fully integrated with the operation of day-ahead and real time 
energy markets as discussed above.  Where this integration has not been 
achieved, as in California, New England, and Texas, congestion costs (or at 
least congestion rents) have increased beyond the efficient level.  
 
d. The definition and allocation of transmission rights is an important aspect of 
wholesale market design and has implications for the design and performance 
of wholesale market institutions.  In the short run, these rights serve as 
(imperfect) hedging instruments against (basis) differences between prices at 
different points on the network.  While these hedging properties can in 
principle be replicated through combinations of forward contracts to buy and 
sell power at different locations, or by third-parties marketing derivatives on 
such transactions, thin markets and potential market power problems may 
limit the development of liquid forward and derivative markets to a much 
smaller number of hubs.  Long-term transmission rights are also likely to be 
important for securing financing for investment in new transmission facilities 
that are built on a merchant basis.  There has been substantial debate about 
whether such rights should be point-to-point financial rights in conjunction 
with nodal pricing or physical flowgate rights in conjunction with a zonal 
pricing system.  In theory these alternatives may look very similar if there is 
little intra-zonal congestion, though physical rights raise additional 
operational issues (Joskow and Tirole 2000).  In practice, my view is that 
financial rights are much easier to implement, involve lower transactions costs 
and are more difficult to use to exercise market power than are physical rights 
on a meshed network.  They are also easier to make compatible with real time 
balancing actions and the associated real time balancing prices.  On radial 
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lines and DC inter-connectors, physical rights may be more attractive, 
especially if the projects are developed on an unregulated merchant basis. I 
realize that the relative performance attributes of physical and financial rights, 
and of nodal vs. zonal pricing systems, is a matter of dispute and I would 
welcome careful empirical analysis of the relative performance attributes of 
the different system.  
 
e. Day-ahead and real time markets for energy and ancillary services should be 
fully integrated and reflect the efficient optimization of energy supply and 
operating reserve resources that can both supply energy (or reduce demand) 
and stand in reserve to respond to short run fluctuations in demand and 
unanticipated outages of generating or transmission facilities.  Wholesale 
market designs that separate energy and individual ancillary services markets 
have performed poorly and are subject to unilateral behavior that increases 
prices and reduces efficiency. 
 
f. The unusual attributes of electricity discussed above create unusual 
opportunities for suppliers to exercise market power unilaterally.  Market 
power problems have been extensively documents in the U.S. and other 
countries (Wolfram 1999, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak 2002, Joskow and 
Kahn 2002).  The incentive and ability to exercise market power is enhanced 
by poor wholesale market design attributes that expand opportunities for 
suppliers to take actions that affect market prices.  Accordingly, the arguments 
about whether market performance problems are due to poor market design or 
market power is an empty debate.  The former simply enhances the latter.  
Because electricity demand is very inelastic in the short run and electricity 
cannot be stored, individual suppliers may be able to move prices significantly 
even in markets that are not very highly concentrated by traditional standards.  
This is most likely to be the case when capacity constraints are approached 
and a large fraction of demand is being served by spot market purchases in 
day-ahead and real time markets rather than pursuant to forward contracts that 
establish the transactions price in advance.  The allocation of transmission 
rights may enhance market power in generation markets as well (Joskow and 
Tirole 2000).  As a result, market design, transmission rights allocation, 
mergers and acquisitions of generating facilities, and market monitoring 
institutions must be sensitive to the potential for serious market power 
problems to emerge in unregulated wholesale power markets. 
 
g. Expanding significantly the requirement that, as the default, larger retail 
consumers be billed based on their real time consumption and associated real 
time prices for energy can help to improve wholesale market performance in a 
number of dimensions.  This will allow consumer preferences for reliability 
and market price volatility to be more accurately represented in the wholesale 
market, help to mitigate market power, flatten load duration curves and reduce 
the need for capacity that operates for only a few hours each year, encourage 
risk-averse consumers to cover their demand with forward contracts, and 
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reduce the need for market power mitigation regulations and resource 
adequacy rules (see below).  At least some of the benefits of real time pricing 
are public goods that benefit all consumers.  Accordingly, it would be 
worthwhile to provide financing to distribution companies to expand the 
default utilization of real time meters. 
 
h. While it is important to move price sensitive consumers on to real time pricing 
for their price sensitive demand, it is also important to provide appropriate 
incentives for load serving entities and consumers to rely more on forward 
contracting and less on spot market purchases to reflect their preferences for 
risk and the costs and benefits of insurance against price volatility.  This will 
help to mitigate market power by reducing supply incentives to withhold 
output from the spot market and drive up spot market prices and provide 
better signals and financing support for investments in new generating 
capacity.  The real time pricing goal and the forward contracting goal are not 
incompatible.  If the default is real time pricing, consumers who are risk 
averse will have a stronger incentive to go out into the market and enter into 
forward contracts for some or all of their demand.  Consumers who are less 
risk averse or can adjust more easily to real time price variations will leave 
more of their demand in the spot market to enable them to respond to short-
term price signals and will cover less with forward contracts. 
 
i. There are important linkages between wholesale market institutions, retail 
procurement, and retail competition institutions.  The infirmities of retail 
competition institutions in many of the states that have implemented retail 
competition programs (see below) and the uncertainties about whether, when 
and how retail competition will spread to other states, has undermined 
incentives for distribution companies and other load serving entities to enter 
into longer term contracts for power and transmission service with potential 
investors in generating and transmission capacity.  This situation will 
exacerbate the boom-bust cycle of the industry, undermine investment 
incentives, increases incentives for suppliers to exercise market power when 
supplies are tight, increases prices volatility, and ultimately increases political 
pressures for regulatory interventions when prices are high. 
 
j. Fraudulent and misleading accounting practices, false reporting of trading 
information to private entities publishing price indices upon which suppliers, 
traders and consumers rely, and the general trend of the late 1990s to make as 
little information as possible available to the public, has undermined the 
confidence of consumers, regulators, and their representatives in state 
legislatures and Congress in competitive electricity markets.  It has also led to 
financial disaster for many merchant generating and energy trading firms and 
destroyed liquidity in forward electricity markets. Well functioning 
competitive electricity markets depend upon the existence of efficient liquid 
forward markets for energy and associated derivative financial instruments to 
allow consumers and generators to manage their risks efficiently.  Restoring 
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public and investor confidence in energy trading and creating liquid 
transparent markets for physical contracts and supporting financial 
instruments to meet the needs of the ultimate buyers and sellers of electricity 
in these markets is an important policy priority. 
 
Many features of FERC’s Standard Market Design (SMD) NOPR issued on July 
31, 2002 reflect these considerations and for this reason provide a useful, though far from 
perfect, blueprint for wholesale market design.9 
 
RETAIL COMPETITION 
 Most of the academic research and many of the public policy debates about 
competitive electricity markets have focused on the design and performance of wholesale 
market and transmission institutions.  However, from a political perspective, the primary 
selling point for competition in electricity among consumers and government officials 
has been the prospect for retail competition or retail “customer choice” to lead to lower 
retail electricity prices.  Yet, there has been very little work assessing the performance of 
retail competition programs in the U.S. and there is a growing perception that, at the very 
least, retail competition programs have had disappointing results, especially from the 
perspective of residential and small commercial customers.  It is too early to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of retail competition programs, many of which have not been 
in operation for very long.  Moreover, inadequate information, especially on prices and 
value added services, makes it difficult to perform a good assessment.  Nevertheless, 
there are things to learn from the experience to date and the data that are available. 
 With a retail competition program, an electricity customer’s bill is “unbundled” 
into regulated components PR (transmission, distribution, stranded cost recovery, retail 
                                                 
9 The SMD NOPR is much less successful in dealing with transmission investment, organization and 
incentive issues.  See the Comments that I submitted to FERC on these issues at  http://econ-
www.mit.edu/faculty/pjoskow/papers.htm  
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service costs to support default services) and a competitive component PC (generation 
service, some retail service costs, and perhaps an additional “margin” to induce 
customers to shop).  The customer continues to buy the regulated component from the 
local distribution company and is free to purchase the competitive component from 
competing retailers or retail Electricity Service Providers (ESP).10   
In most jurisdictions that have introduced retail competition programs, the 
incumbent distribution company is required to continue to provide “default service” of 
some kind to retail consumers who do not choose an ESP.  The terms and conditions of 
default service vary across the states, but typically have been calculated in the following 
way.  The regulators start with the incumbent’s prevailing regulated cost of generation 
service.  A fraction of this regulated generation cost component is determined to be 
“stranded generation costs” that can be recovered from retail consumers over some time 
period and is included in PR.  The residual, reflecting an estimate of the competitive 
market value of generation services, plus some fraction of retail service costs (metering, 
billing, customer call centers) is then used to define the initial “default service” price PC 
or the “price to beat” by ESPs seeking to attract customers from the regulated default 
service tariffs available from the incumbent utility.11  The value of PC is then typically 
fixed for several years (sometimes with adjustments for fuel prices) but is expected 
                                                 
10 The ESP may, however, bundle the regulated delivery services and competitive services together, 
reimbursing the distribution company for PR. 
 
11 Some states (e.g. Massachusetts) define the default service price, “price to beat,” or “price to compare” 
with reference to the competitive component PC only since the PR component is set by regulation and must 
be paid to the distribution company, regardless of  which ESP supplies a customer with unbundled 
competitive services.  Other states (e.g. Texas) define the “price to beat” with reference to the total of the 
regulated and competitive components (PR + PC).  In the latter case, ESPs quote customers a price for the 
combination of the regulated T&D charge and the competitive generation service charge they are offering.  
Arithmetically, the two approaches are the same, but they may have different implications from a 
marketing perspective. 
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eventually to reflect the competitive market value of providing competitive retail services 
to consumers.  
Where incumbents have significant stranded costs, which is the case in most of 
the states that have introduced retail competition to date, regulators have been able to 
capture a small fraction of this sum for customers by mandating an initial retail price 
reduction that is reflected in PR, though in many cases this is simply a deferral of 
recovery of these costs to future years.  Regulators in a number of states have consciously 
left some of the stranded costs in the default service price PC so that it exceeds the 
wholesale market value of the associated generation services in order to encourage 
customers to switch to competitive retailers, though in a number of cases the utility may 
ultimately be able to recover any associated losses in stranded costs in the future through 
surcharges included in PR.   
Things become more complicated when the incumbent utility has a prevailing 
regulated price whose regulated generation cost component is below the competitive 
wholesale market value of the associated electricity.  And there are many utilities around 
the country that have regulated generation cost components of their retail rates that are 
below the competitive wholesale market value price of electricity (mostly in states that 
have decided against implementing retail competition programs and this is not a 
coincidence)  In this case, the bundled price is also below the price that would prevail if a 
customer purchased regulated services at the regulated price and competitive services at 
their market values; the incumbent utility effectively has negative stranded costs.  
Regulators could handle negative stranded costs symmetrically with positive stranded 
costs by setting the price for competitive service PC at its competitive market value and 
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then providing a “stranded benefit” credit in the distribution charge PR to settle up on the 
historical “regulatory bargain.”  However, this is not how regulators have handled prices 
for the few companies with negative stranded costs in states that have implemented retail 
competition programs.  Instead they have just unbundled (more or less) the low 
prevailing regulated generation cost component of the regulated bundled rate and 
established that as the default service price.  In these cases, ESPs that purchase power in 
competitive wholesale markets cannot compete with the default service price PC since it 
reflects prevailing embedded costs of generation that are below the competitive market 
value of generation services.  Moreover, as wholesale market prices have risen over time, 
the initial values of PC in states where utilities did have stranded costs and that were 
typically frozen for several years, wholesale market prices for electricity subsequently 
rose (unexpectedly) to levels above PC.  In many states, customers are free to return to the 
default service tariff if the prices offered by competitive retailers are higher than the 
distribution company’s default service prices and this is exactly what has happened in 
some states. 
Consumers can benefit in at least four ways from the introduction of retail 
competition.  First, even if they do not switch to an ESP they may benefit from reductions 
in regulated prices that have typically accompanied the restructuring process as an 
outcome of the bargaining over stranded cost recovery and the terms and conditions 
under which the incumbents can move their regulated generating plants into unregulated 
affiliates.  Second, consumers can benefit by receiving lower prices than the default 
service price PC from an ESP that has competed successfully for their business.  Third, 
ESPs may offer consumers a variety of value added services, including price risk 
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management, demand management, and energy efficiency services. Finally, competing 
ESPs may be able to provide “retailing” services more efficiently that can the incumbent.  
However, here we must recognize that retail service costs are a small fraction of a typical 
customer’s bill, amounting to 0.3 to 0.4 cents/kWh or about $3 - $7 per month for a 
typical residential customer (depending on assumptions about fixed vs. variable 
components of retail service costs) (Joskow 2000b).  Since the incumbent monopolies did 
not have to incur marketing and advertising costs to attract customers, these are 
additional costs that are not now reflected in regulated retail prices but would have to be 
incurred by ESPs  
 
Switching Activity 
Rational residential consumers will switch to an ESP if the incumbent utility’s 
default service price PC plus any transactions costs associated with switching suppliers is 
less than the price offered by competitive ESPs plus the value of any value added 
services that the ESP provides.  There is reasonably good data available (with some 
effort) to measure the extent to which customers have switched to ESPs and I will focus 
on that information first.  Switching behavior by consumers reflects their revealed 
preference for default service or ESP service, though absent information on ESP prices 
and value added services we cannot disentangle switching costs, commodity price 
differences and the value of any value added services provided to consumers.   In Tables 
5 to 9 and Figures 3 and 4, I have displayed the most recent data available for the fraction 
of residential, commercial and industrial customers who have switched to ESPs in several 
representative states that have implemented retail competition programs.  The states that 
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have introduced retail competition provide different amounts of information regarding 
customer switching activity, so the information is not always comparable across states. 
Let us start with Massachusetts (Table 5), which was the first state to make retail 
competition available to all customers in March 1998, so that retail customer choice has 
been available for almost five years.  During that period of time, less that 3% of the 
residential customers and less than 9% of the small commercial and industrial customers 
have switched to ESPs.  About 30% of the largest industrial customers have switched to 
ESPs.  Within each customer class, the customers consuming more electricity are more 
likely to switch to an ESP.  Overall, 3.4% of the retail customers and 22% of the retail 
demand is supplied by ESPs.   The remaining customers are served on one of two default 
service tariffs (called “standard offer service” and “default service” in Massachusetts,  
with the latter tracking wholesale market prices).  During the period of time that retail 
choice has been available, the standard offer tariff has often provided electricity at a price 
below the wholesale market price, making ESP supplies unprofitable.  The default service 
price fluctuates with wholesale market conditions, but leaves little if any margin for ESPs 
to recover their retailing costs.  While all consumers have the right to choose their 
electricity supplier in Massachusetts, there is presently little if any competition from 
ESPs to serve smaller customers. 
Let us turn next to New York (Table 6), where retail competition became 
available between May 1998 and July 2001 depending on the utility service area and the 
type of customer.  There has been somewhat more switching than in Massachusetts, but 
the basic patterns and economic incentives are very similar.  In both Massachusetts and 
New York, there has been some switching back and forth between ESPs and default 
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service tariffs as wholesale prices have fluctuated and ESPs have exited the market.  In 
Maine (Table 7) as well, residential and small commercial customers have not switched 
to ESPs (or those who switched have now switched back to utility default service), 
though there has been more switching by larger industrial customers.  We can compare 
Massachusetts, New York, and Maine to New Jersey (Table 8), where retail competition 
began in November 1999.  After over three years of customer choice there are almost no 
customers of any kind who have chosen to be supplied by an ESP in New Jersey, largely 
because the regulated default service price has been below the comparable wholesale 
market price for electricity.   The situation in New Jersey appears to have evolved into a 
wholesale competition model in which the incumbent distribution company purchases 
wholesale generation services through a state-approved competitive auction process and 
then pass along the associated costs to retail customers.  At the present time in New 
England,  New York and New Jersey, a residential or small commercial customer who 
wanted to be supplied by an ESP would find it hard to find one.  Most of those that were 
active in this region initially have now exited the market or are not actively marketing 
services to residential and small commercial customers. 
Pennsylvania provides an interesting example of the interactions between 
changing wholesale market prices, default service prices, and the initial regulated utility 
cost conditions that had an impact on the level of these default service prices.  Figure 3A 
and Figure 3B display the fraction of retail demand that has been served by ESPs at 
various points in time from April 2000 through January 2003 for each of six major 
Pennsylvania utilities.  Figure 3A displays this information for residential customers.  
Except for Duquesne, all of these utilities are in PJM and buy and sell power out of the 
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same wholesale market.  Yet each of them has a different default service price, reflecting 
the different levels of their regulated retail prices (and stranded generation costs) prior to 
restructuring.  Note first that there is a very large variation across utilities in the fraction 
of residential demand served by ESPs.  Those with the highest switching rates (PECO 
and Duquesne) serve Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, had high regulated retail prices and 
significant stranded costs prior to the implementation of the retail competition and 
restructuring program.12  In their restructuring settlements, the value of PC was set 
relatively high compared to then-prevailing wholesale market prices, reflecting stranded 
cost allocations.  The “price to beat” faced by ESPs was sufficiently high relative to then-
prevailing wholesale market prices to make it profitable, at least initially, for ESPs to 
make offers to customers that were sufficiently far below the default service price to get a 
significant number of customers quickly to switch to an ESP.  The other utilities in 
Pennsylvania had relatively low regulated rates prior to restructuring and relatively low 
values for PC.  Since ESPs must buy power in the wholesale market at higher prices than 
the utility default price available to retail customers they have not been able profitable to 
offer attractive competitive alternatives to retail customers in these areas.  Note as well 
that over time, the fraction of residential customers in Pennsylvania receiving service 
from an ESP has declined very significantly.  This reflects the fact that as wholesale 
prices rose after the default prices were set, and retailers realized how costly it actually is 
to serve residential customers, they raised their prices, or withdrew from the market, and 
residential customers they were serving found it advantageous or necessary to return to 
their utility’s default service tariff.  Based on the results of PECO’s recent effort to 
                                                 
12 Duquesne’s stranded costs have now been recovered and the associated charges eliminated from the 
prices that it charges for distribution service. 
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auction off some of its small commercial default service customers to ESPs, there seems 
to be little interest among ESPs in provided service at a price significantly below PECO’s 
default service price.13   
Table 3B displays the same data for industrial customers.  A larger fraction of 
industrial customers initially switched to ESPs.  Then many of them returned to default 
service when wholesale prices rose.  Some now appear to be returning again to ESPs in a 
few utility service areas.  This back and forth between utility default service and 
competitive ESP service is a consequence of the “safety net” provided by the regulated 
default service prices available from the incumbent utility supplier.  
Ohio also provides an interesting example of how the interaction between 
regulation, default service terms, and wholesale market prices affects consumer switching 
behavior.  Retail competition began in Ohio in January 2001.  Table 9 displays the 
fraction of customers served by ESPs in different utility service areas.  In the areas served 
by subsidiaries of AEP and Dayton Power and Light, essentially no customers are served 
by ESPs.  These are utilities that had very low regulated retail prices and the value of PC 
establish at the beginning of retail prices reflected these low regulated rates.  The 
regulated default prices in these areas are lower than the wholesale market price.   
However, in the areas served by First Energy’s subsidiaries there has been very 
significant movement of retail customers to ESPs.  Indeed, residential customers appear 
to have switched at the same rate or even at a greater rate than industrial customers.  First 
Energy’s subsidiaries had high regulated retail prices, the value of PC was consciously set 
                                                 
13 The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission required PECO to auction off 64,000 commercial 
customers because too few customers had chosen voluntarily to be served by ESPs.  The average discount 
offered by the winning bidders was 1.25% off the default service price.  Customers can opt out of the 
“draft” if they fill out a postcard or call PECO.  Dow Jones Business Service, February 27, 2003.  
http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/030227/1853001167_1.html . 
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at a relatively high level to put recovery of some of the utilities’ stranded costs at risk, 
and there were some other incentives related to stranded cost recovery that made it in 
First Energy’s interest to migrate customers to ESPs.  Moreover, the data for residential 
customers is misleading.  Ohio has a municipal aggregation program that allows 
municipalities to purchase power on behalf of the customers within their municipal 
boundaries (customers have an opt-out option).  About 90% of the residential customers 
listed as being served by ESPs are actually being served through municipal aggregation 
programs in which an ESP can effectively serve all of the customers located in that 
municipality.  This is really a wholesale competition program rather than a retail 
competition program. 
Finally, let’s turn to Texas (Figures 4A, 4B and 4C).  Retail competition began 
officially in Texas in January 2002, though there was a pilot program implemented before 
that and customers who had switched before the official program began could stay with 
the ESPs they had chosen.  By the end of 2002 between 4% and 10% of the residential 
customers had switched to ESPs, and the fraction continues to grow (rather than to 
decline as in Pennsylvania).  For commercial customers, 10% to 15% had switched to 
ESPs by the end of 2002, while 20% of the largest customers, accounting for 50% of the 
revenues from large industrial customers, had switched to an ESP, and virtually all of the 
largest customers have negotiated competitive contracts either with the retailing affiliate 
of their incumbent utility or an unaffiliated ESP.  So, in only a year, and despite some 
initial technical problems experienced with switching customers, Texas appears to be on 
a trend in which customers are migrating relatively quickly to ESPs.  It is also the state 
that has the largest number of active ESPs competing to sell service to retail consumers. 
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We can compare the switching experience with that in England and Wales since 
1990.  In England and Wales retail competition started with the largest industrial and 
commercial retail customers (> 1 Mw initially) and was gradually expanded to industrial 
and commercial customer groups with smaller consumption levels (peak demand greater 
that 100 Kw in 1994).  By 2000, about 80% of industrial and commercial customers with 
peak demands above 1 Mw and about 70% with peak demand below 1 Mw (and greater 
than 100 Kw) had switched to a competitive retail supplier other than the incumbent 
distribution company’s ESP affiliate.  These switching shares have increased 
monotonically over time (DTI, 2000). In May 1999, retail competition was opened up to 
residential (domestic) customers.  Initially, the prices that could be charged to residential 
customers by the incumbent electricity distributor-affiliated ESP were regulated with a 
price cap and the incumbent retail supplier had a continuing obligation to provide service 
to residential customers in their service areas at a price no higher than the regulated 
supply price.  By the end of 2001, about 30% of the residential customers had switched to 
competing ESPs and by mid-2002 this fraction had reached 34% (DTI 2003, p.97).  In 
April 2002, the default service price caps applicable to residential customers were lifted 
and retail supply prices were fully deregulated for all types of customers (OFGEM 2001, 
DTI 2003).  The retail competition program in England and Wales has been much more 
successful in facilitating migration of retail customers from default service to non-
incumbent ESPs than have the programs in the U.S. 
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Retail Price and Value Added Service Effects   
Unfortunately, there is very little information available to evaluate systematically 
the price effects of retail competition or even the level of retail prices charged by ESPs in 
the U.S.  Nor is there information about the diffusion of the value added services that 
many retailers argued would be made available to retail customers.  The Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) has begun to collect retail price data separately for 
utility and ESP supplied retail service, but sufficient data are not yet available to do a 
proper comprehensive analysis.  Moreover, the relevant comparison is not between what 
retail prices are today and what they were when retail competition began, but rather the 
difference between what they are with retail competition and what they would have been 
without it.  This will be a difficult counterfactual analysis to undertake, requiring an 
incorporation of fuel price changes, other changes in O&M costs, changes in the utilities’ 
rate bases, cost of capital, etc., to measure what regulated prices would have been absent 
restructuring settlements. 
Since so few customers have switched to competitive retailers in most states, it 
must be the case that the bulk of any savings that they have achieved are attributable to 
reductions in regulated prices implemented as a consequence of restructuring compared 
to what these regulated prices would have been absent restructuring.  This is especially 
true for residential customers.  The Texas PUC estimates that “price-to-beat customers” 
(residential, commercial, and industrial customers with peak demands below 1 Mw) 
saved $902 million in 2002 if they stayed on the “price to beat” rates.  This sum is 
composed of $262 million attributed to a mandated 6% retail price reduction included as 
part of the restructuring program and $677 million attributed to reduced fuel costs and the 
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expiration of fuel surcharges.14  Roughly 10% of these customers have switched to ESPs 
and, assuming (contrary to fact) that they all switched to the ESP offering the lowest 
price, this would imply another $64 million in savings directly attributable to retail 
competition for residential customers in 2002.15  Figure 5 displays information on the 
price to beat and the competitive ESP prices being offered to residential customers with 
different average monthly consumption levels for one utility service area in Texas during 
2002.16 The discounts from the incumbent’s price to beat are in the 4% to 10% range.  
This is a similar magnitude to the discounts offered in England and Wales by non-
incumbent ESPs competing for residential customers in England and Wales. Discounts of 
this magnitude are apparently sufficient to overcome transactions costs associated with 
switching by roughly 10% of the residential and smaller commercial customers during 
the first year that the retail competition program is in effect.  However, so far it appears 
that the bulk of any retail price savings resulting directly from retail competition have 
accrued primarily to industrial customers in Texas and most other states that have 
implemented retail competition programs.    
We can gain some further insights into the challenges associated with measuring 
the impact of retail competition on retail prices by comparing the patterns of retail prices 
charged to residential customers by utilities between states that have introduced retail 
competition and those that have not.  90% or more of residential customers continue to 
                                                 
14 It is difficult to believe that it is appropriate to attribute fuel price reductions and the end fuel surcharges 
as a benefit of restructuring.  These costs were traditionally treated as pass-throughs under regulation.  
Moreover, the relevant comparison is not with the 6% mandatory reduction from 1999 prices, but what 
prices would have been if standard regulatory procedures had been followed. 
 
15 Public Utility Commission of Texas, February 2003 Report Card on Competition. 
 
16 Many ESPs offer flat rates annual rates while the incumbent supplier’s price to beat may vary from 
month to month.  Accordingly, annual comparisons provide a better picture than do monthly comparisons. 
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take service from their local utility in most states that have introduced retail competition.  
If there were significantly more attractive prices offered by ESPs we would have seen 
much more switching by now, as in Texas.  Figure 6 displays the patterns of average 
residential prices for eight states with the most active retail competition programs, along 
with the average residential price for the U.S. as a whole for the period 1995 through  
2002.17  Figure 7 displays the percentage change in nominal residential prices for each of 
these eight retail competition states and for the U.S. as a whole.  Note first that except for 
Texas, all of these pioneer retail competition states had prices in the mid-1990s that 
exceeded the national average, typically by a substantial amount.18  Retail prices for 
residential customers in Texas in 1995 were just slightly below the national average.   On 
average residential prices fell by 3.72% in these eight retail competition states between 
1995 and 2002, compared to an average increase of 0.5% for the U.S. as a whole.  The 
two states with the largest reduction in residential prices are New Jersey and Illinois.  
Both states have essentially no residential customers who have switched to an ESP, so 
any savings from restructuring are reflected entirely in changes in the prices of regulated 
default service.  Since seven of the eight retail competition states had residential prices 
that were above the national average it is also likely that the prices in these states would 
have fallen more than the average if regulation had continued, reflecting the declining 
                                                 
17 These price data come from the March Issue of the EIA publication Electric Power Monthly.  They are 
far from ideal since they include municipal and cooperative as well as investor-owned utility sales and 
revenues.  The 2002 data are preliminary and the numbers for California look wrong to me.   Further 
analysis as additional data become available would be desirable. 
 
18Connecticut, Rhode Island, Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, and Delaware also had above average retail 
prices.  The only states that have introduced retail competition for residential customers that had below 
average prices were Texas and Virginia.  Oregon, which has very low retail rates, technically introduced 
retail competition for large industrial customers only in 2002.  However, no customers have chosen to be 
served by an ESP because the rate options offered by the local utilities (including a floating market-based 
rate option) are cheaper.  
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rate bases associated with costly nuclear power plants, increased capacity utilization as 
demand increased, and the gradual end of high-priced QF contracts signed during the 
1980s.  Texas, the only state in the group which had residential prices below the national 
average in 1995, experienced the largest increase in prices by 2002.  If retail competition 
per se has had any effect on residential prices in the U.S. it must be small.  However, this 
is an area where a more comprehensive analysis of counterfactual regulated prices and 
ESP prices would be valuable when and if the necessary data become available. 
I think that it is fair to say that retail competition is still a work in progress in the 
U.S. and that retail competition has been a disappointment in many of the states that have 
implemented it.  It should be no surprise that the remaining states, which typically have 
much lower regulated prices than did the retail competition pioneer states, would not find 
the performance to date to provide a particularly compelling case to introduce retail 
competition.  Factors that need to be recognized and issues that need to be addressed in 
reforming existing retail competition programs or designing new programs include the 
following: 
 
a. If the primary selling point for introducing retail competition continues to be 
that it will result in significantly lower retail prices from those that prevail 
today, retail competition will be a very tough sell politically in many of the 
states that have not already embraced it.  In the states that have introduced 
retail competition, few residential or small commercial customers have chosen 
to be served by ESPs and the direct benefits of retail competition per se, in 
terms of lower prices, appear to be very small. Large industrial and 
commercial customers appear to have done much better in states that had 
relatively high regulated rates, at least based on revealed preference in the 
absence of publicly available retail price data for these customers.  Many of 
the states that have not introduced retail competition have relatively low 
regulated retail prices; many with regulated prices for generation services that 
are lower than comparable wholesale market prices.  Unless state regulators 
are willing to allow retail prices to rise to reflect the competitive market value 
of generation services, ESPs will not be able to compete against these low 
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regulated generation prices if they are unbundled at their current or lower 
levels.  Accordingly, it is not surprising that there is little interest in retail 
competition in those states that have low regulated retail prices. 
 
b. If default service prices are set below the comparable wholesale market price 
of power, ESPs will not be able to compete for retail customers.  Moreover, 
allowing customers that choose to take service from an ESP to return to a 
regulated tariff when wholesale prices are high without being charged an 
appropriate price for this option, seriously undermines the development of 
retail competition because it effectively provides a subsidized option for retail 
customers who switch back and forth and a very unstable customer base for 
ESPs.19  This subsidized default service option also has adverse effects on 
wholesale markets by discouraging both utilities with default service 
obligations and ESPs from entering into long term forward contracts since 
under the rules in place in most states, consumers are free to come and go 
from the regulated default tariff as they choose.  
 
c. Even if the regulated default service price PC is higher than the comparable 
competitive wholesale market value of the power supplied, ESPs need an 
additional margin both to induce sticky retail customers to switch suppliers 
and to cover their retail supply costs. The retail supply costs for the mass 
market (residential and small commercial) are much higher than many 
retailers had anticipated.  Billing, customer service, bad debt, advertising and 
promotion costs add up quickly.  Moreover, there are significant economies of 
scale associated with several components of these costs.  Accordingly, PC may 
have to be much higher than the comparable wholesale market price to induce 
much customer switching. The evidence from England and Wales suggests 
that price reductions of 5% to 10% of the total bill are necessary to get 
significant customer switching for mass market (residential and commercial) 
customers. This is consistent with the limited experience in Texas as well.  If 
the generation component of the retail price is 50% of the total bill, then price 
reductions of 10% to 20% on the generation component are necessary to get 
significant switching.  To this must be added about another 5% to 10% for 
retail service costs.  So, a margin of 15% to 30% between PC and the 
comparable wholesale market value of power may be necessary to induce 
significant switching by residential and small commercial customers.  In many 
areas of the U.S. this kind of margin is incompatible with reducing retail 
prices from their prevailing regulated levels. 
 
d. It is far from obvious to me that residential and small commercial customers 
have or will benefit much, if at all, from retail competition compared to a 
regime where their local distribution company purchased power for their 
                                                 
19 This is not the case in Texas where customers that cease being served by an ESP are put on a Provider of 
Last Resort (POLR) rate that is market-based (through an auction) and reflects the attributes of customers 
who are likely to be dropped by their ESP.  However, it also is not the case in Massachusetts and in New 
York City where default service customers are served on a separate market-based default service tariff. 
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needs by putting together a portfolio of short term forward contracts (from 
days to several years) acquired in wholesale markets (Joskow (2000, 2000b).20  
This is effectively what is happening in most of the states that have introduced 
retail competition anyway, except the wholesale contracts are largely short-
term and the threat of draconian policy changes to “make retail competition 
work” lead both utilities and ESPs to be very reluctant to make longer term 
commitments for power supplies of any kind.  There is no evidence that 
residential and small commercial customers are getting any significant value 
added services that they find sufficiently attractive to shop and choose an 
ESP.  For those states that have not introduced retail competition it would be 
worth considering introducing it first for larger customers and then expanding 
eligibility over time as the retail market institutions develop.  
 
If policymakers are committed to fostering retail competition for residential and 
small commercial customers, despite the possibility that retail prices will rise in the short 
run due to increased transactions costs, switching costs and market power, the framework 
adopted by Texas, a framework with many similarities to what was adopted in England 
and Wales, is likely to be the most successful in stimulating retail shopping and the 
development of a viable retail supply sector.  It has several components: 
 
a. All retail supply functions of the incumbent regulated utility are shifted to a 
retail supply affiliate, and ideally, this retail supply affiliate should be 
separated through sale or flotation from the regulated delivery business.  All 
of the associated retail supply costs are unbundled from the distribution and 
transmission charges and included in the default service price.  ESPs then 
have a shot at a PC that includes all of the incumbent’s retail supply costs. The 
retail supply affiliate has the obligation to provide regulated default service to 
retail customers for a defined period of time or until market conditions are 
sufficiently competitive to deregulated retail prices completely.  The decision 
to fully deregulate should be sensitive to evidence that residential customers 
have high switching costs and that the incumbent may have significant market 
power for some period of time (Giulietti, Price, and Waterson 2003). 
 
b. The default service price should reflect the competitive wholesale market 
value of electricity over the period during which the default service prices are 
to be in effect plus retail service costs.  The incumbent supplier should be free 
to cover these commitments with a portfolio of contracts and ownership of 
generating assets and to try to reduce retail supply costs under a price cap and 
subject to quality of service criteria and penalties for failing to meet them.  
                                                 
20 See Littlechild (2003) for a different view. 
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For utilities that have stranded costs, they can be recovered through a non-
bypassable surcharge attached to distribution or transmission charges.  
Utilities whose regulated prices for generation service are below competitive 
market values should be treated symmetrically.  A measure of the associated 
“stranded benefits” should be developed and accounted for as a rebate 
attached to regulated distribution and transmission prices.  Thus, even in states 
with very low regulated prices, the unbundled generation component will 
reflect prevailing market values while consumers still capture their entitlement 
to the “cheap” power from generating plants they have paid for through 
regulated prices through lower delivery charges. 
 
c. Once customers turn to an ESP they do not get to come back to the default 
service price.  Instead they are served by a Provider of Last Resort (POLR) at 
prices determined through an auction of the POLR service responsibility. 
 
d. When wholesale and retail markets are deemed to be sufficiently mature and 
competitive, retail generation prices are deregulated and the incumbent’s retail 
supply affiliate has the opportunity to charge any remaining customers an 
unregulated price.  This provides the incumbent retail supplier with a 
potentially valuable opportunity to supply the stickiest customers at 
unregulated prices if the competition in the retail market evolves sufficiently 
to trigger the deregulation brass ring.  This potential business opportunity also 
makes it fair for the incumbent to be at risk for some of its retail service costs, 
many components of which are fixed in the short run and needed to serve the 
initially large default service customer base.  Rather than being indifferent to 
whether retail customers switch to an ESP or not, which is the case in most 
states where retail competition has been implemented, the incumbent has an 
interest in encouraging enough of its customers to turn to competitive retail 
suppliers so that the competitive retail supply market will flourish.   
 
 
LONG TERM RESOURCE ADEQUACY  
 Despite the substantial amount of new generating capacity that has been 
completed in the last few years, and what appears to be more than adequate capacity to 
meet peak demands in most regions of the country, there are growing concerns that 
wholesale energy and operating reserve markets will not provide adequate incentives to 
bring forth sufficient new generating capacity in the future to meet traditional reliability 
criteria.  These concerns reflect a number of phenomena, including the financial collapse 
of the merchant generation and trading sector, the cancellation of many planned 
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generating projects, tougher financial requirements and increased cost of capital to 
finance new merchant projects, very thin markets for medium and long term forward 
contracts for energy and operating reserves to help to support financing of new projects, 
proposals to terminate installed capacity (ICAP) obligations that now exist in the three 
Eastern ISOs, the effects of price caps and various bid mitigation rules that are applied to 
spot markets, and increasing pressures to close older existing plants as they face low 
wholesale prices and additional costs to meet new environmental requirements.  FERC’s 
SMD NOPR concludes that spot market prices for energy and operating reserves alone 
will not stimulate adequate and efficient investment in generating capacity and demand-
response capabilities to achieve reliability levels that match consumer 
preferences/valuation for reliability. It cites a number of market and institutional 
imperfections that could lead to under-investment in the future.   
 I think that there are good reasons to believe that spot market prices for energy 
and operating reserves alone, as they are now constituted and in the present state of 
partial and somewhat chaotic transition from regulated monopoly to competitive markets, 
are unlikely to provide adequate incentives to achieve generating capacity levels that 
match consumers’ preferences for reliability. A variety of market and institutional 
imperfections contribute to this problem. I will present some empirical evidence below 
that reinforces this conclusion.  
 Questions about whether competitive wholesale and retail markets would produce 
adequate generation investment incentives to balance supply and demand so as to match 
consumer valuations of reliability have been raised since the transition to competitive 
electricity markets began.  Until 2001, the system in England and Wales provided for 
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additional capacity payments to be made to all generators scheduled to supply during 
hours when supply was unusually tight (high loss-of-load probability).21  The markets 
administered by the Eastern ISOs continued their traditional policies of requiring 
distribution companies (or more generally “load serving entities” (LSE) to encompass 
ESPs) to enter into contracts for capacity to meet their projected peak demand plus an 
administratively determined reserve margin.  Similar requirements continue to be applied 
by utilities in those states that have not introduced retail competition and continue to rely 
primarily on vertically integrated utilities which may purchase some of their forecast 
capacity needs in the wholesale market.  Argentina’s competitive electricity market 
system also included capacity payments to stimulate investment in reserve capacity.  In 
Chile, distribution utilities are required to enter into forward contracts to meet forecast 
demand plus a reserve margin.  However, California’s electricity market design did not 
impose capacity, reserve or forward contract obligations, nor does Texas.  
 At it’s core, the questions about whether wholesale markets will bring forth 
adequate investments in generating capacity arises from the unusual characteristics of 
electricity supply and demand discussed earlier: (a) large variations in demand over the 
course of a year; (b) non-storability; (c) the need to physically balance supply and 
demand at every point on the network continuously to meet physical constraints on 
voltage, frequency, and stability; and (d) that even under the best of circumstances (i.e. 
with effective real time pricing of energy and operating reserves) non-price mechanisms 
will have to be relied upon from time to time to ration imbalances between supply and 
demand to meet physical operating reliability criteria because markets cannot clear fast 
                                                 
21 This payment mechanism was dropped when the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) system 
was introduced in 2001. 
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enough to do so without unplanned outages.  These attributes have a number of 
implications.  First, a large amount of generating capacity that is available to meet peak 
demand plus the associated operating reserve requirements supplies relatively small 
amounts of energy during the year.  For example, in New England in 2001, 93% of the 
energy was supplied by 55% of the installed generating capacity while the remaining 
45% of the capacity supplied only about 7% of the energy.22   Potential investors in new 
generating capacity must expect to cover their variable operating costs, their fixed 
operating and maintenance costs, and their capital costs from sales of energy and 
operating reserves over the life of generating capacity under consideration.  The return of 
and on the associated capital investment in new generating capacity is the difference 
between the prices they receive for generation services (including capacity payment, if 
any) and their operating (primarily fuel) costs.  The profitability of generating units that 
are likely to operate only for a relatively small number of hours in each year (“peaking 
capacity”) are especially sensitive to the level of prices that are realized during the small 
number of high demand hours in which they provide energy or operating reserves. 
 Second, the generating capacity available to supply energy at any point in time 
must always be greater than the demand for energy at that point in time as a result of the 
need to carry “inventory” in the form of generators providing frequency regulation and 
operating reserve services.  That is, generating capacity (or in principle demand response) 
must be available that is either “spinning” or available to start up quickly to provide 
energy to balance supply and demand at each location on the network in response to real 
time variations in demand and unplanned equipment outages.  When these operating 
reserves fall below a certain level (e.g. 7% of demand), system operators begin to take 
                                                 
22 Sithe Energy presentation, IAEE, Boston Chapter,  February 19, 2003. 
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actions to reduce demand administratively according to a pre-specified hierarchy of 
“operating reserve conservation” actions.  The final actions in this hierarchy are voltage 
reductions and non-price rationing of demand (rolling blackouts).   
 Finally, there is an important but under-appreciated linkage between the retail 
procurement environment and the performance of the wholesale market with regard to 
investments in generating capacity that runs infrequently to meet peak demands for 
energy and operating reserves.  If we are in a world where regulated monopoly 
distribution companies (i.e. no retail competition) are required to purchase electricity for 
their retail customers to meet their forecast demand subject to a clearly defined reliability 
criterion (e.g. specified loss of load probability and associated capacity margin above 
expected peak demand) then wholesale market prices (spot and forward) would rise, in 
one way or another, to clear the market at this reliability level.  If, however, we are in a 
retail competition world, or in a world where distribution companies choose to have no 
predetermined reliability criterion but simply buy enough energy and operating reserves 
to meet demand at each point in time as it is realized, the implicit reliability and 
generating capacity level at which the wholesale market will clear will depend on exactly 
how consumer preferences for electricity with regard to price levels and price volatility 
are represented in the wholesale market, the associated ability of consumers to respond to 
real time prices and to match their preferences for market price risk with the costs of 
forward contracts. 
A well functioning perfectly competitive wholesale electricity market will (to 
oversimplify for this discussion) operate in one of two states of nature.  Under typical 
operating conditions (State 1), market clearing prices for energy and operating reserves 
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should equal the marginal (opportunity) cost of the last increment of generating capacity 
that just clears supply and demand at each point in time.23  In the case of wholesale 
electric energy supply, this price is the marginal cost of producing a little more or a little 
less energy from the generating unit on the margin in the merit order.  See Figure 8 which 
depicts the sport market demand for electricity and the competitive supply curve for 
electricity under typical operating conditions (State 1).  Inframarginal generating units 
earn net revenues to cover their fixed costs whenever the market clearing price exceeds 
their own marginal generation costs.  In the case of operating reserves, the efficient price 
is (roughly) equal to the difference between the price of energy and the marginal cost of 
the next increment of generation that could supply energy profitably if the price of energy 
were slightly higher plus any direct costs incurred to provide operating reserves (e.g. 
costs associated with spinning).  This price for operating reserves is equal to the marginal 
opportunity cost incurred by generators standing in reserve rather than supplying energy.  
Under typical operating conditions (state 1) the price of operating reserves will be very 
small --- close to zero, and far below the price of energy.  
The second wholesale market state (state 2) is associated with a relatively small 
number of hours each year when there would be excess demand at a wholesale price that 
equals to the marginal supply cost of the last increment of generating capacity that can 
physically be made available on the network to supply energy or operating reserves.  In 
this case, the market must be cleared “on the demand side.”  That is, consumers bidding 
to obtain energy would bid prices up to a (much) higher level reflecting the value (or 
value of lost energy or load) that consumers place on consuming less electricity as 
                                                 
23 This will, of course, also be the value consumers place on this energy at the margin where supply and 
demand are equal. 
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demand is reduced to match the limited supplies available to the market.  This second 
state is depicted in Figure 9.  In what follows, I will refer to the conditions depicted in 
Figure 9 as competitive “scarcity” conditions.24  
Under competitive scarcity conditions (i.e. in the absence of seller market power), 
the competitive market clearing price of energy will now generally be much higher than 
the marginal production cost of supplying the last available increment of energy from 
generating capacity available to the network, reflecting the high opportunity cost (value 
of lost energy or lost load) that consumers place on reducing consumption by a 
significant amount on short notice.  Furthermore, while the price of operating reserves 
will continue to be equal to the marginal opportunity cost incurred by generators standing 
in reserve rather than supplying energy, the opportunity cost of standing in reserve rather 
than supplying energy will rise significantly as well in response to the higher “scarcity 
value” of energy.  All generating units actually supplying energy and operating reserves 
in the spot market during scarcity conditions would earn substantial “scarcity rents.”   
These scarcity rents in turn help to cover their fixed capital and operating costs.   
For base load and cycling units, the net revenues they earn during scarcity conditions 
may account for a significant fraction of the total net revenues they earn throughout the 
year.  For peaking capacity that supplies energy or operating reserves primarily during 
such scarcity conditions, the net revenues they earn during these periods will account for 
substantially all of the net revenues available to cover their fixed costs (capital, 
maintenance and operating.).  The number of hours in which “scarcity” conditions 
emerge depends upon the amount of generating capacity that has been installed and is 
                                                 
24 To distinguish it from contrived scarcity resulting from suppliers withholding supplies from the market to 
drive up prices. 
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physically available to operate relative to the tail of the distribution of aggregate demand 
realization during the year.  This amount of generating capacity that is physically 
available to the network will then depend on investors in generating capacity balancing 
the costs of additional investments against the net revenues they expect to receive, 
including the “scarcity” rents produced when this state of nature emerges, from spot 
market sales and through forward contracts.  The prices for such forward contracts are 
necessarily linked to future expected spot market prices and consumer and supplier 
preferences for market price risk.     
 If wholesale markets worked perfectly, prices during state 1 conditions and state 2 
conditions would provide the appropriate price signals to link consumer preferences for 
reliability with the costs of supplying reliability with compatible investments in 
generating capacity.  Moreover, with a set of liquid competitive forward markets for 
energy and for associated derivative instruments, consumer risk preferences and investor 
costs of bearing risk (and their cost of capital) could be matched through forward 
contracting and price hedging actions.  Unfortunately, there are a number of market 
imperfections that undermine the operation and performance of the idealized (and 
necessarily over-simplified) competitive wholesale market that I have just described.  The 
most important market and institutional imperfections are: 
 
a. Consumer demand for energy and reliability are not well represented in 
wholesale spot markets today.  Due to metering costs, communications and 
consumer response limitations, and the slow diffusion of both, consumers do 
not “see” all relevant spot prices for energy and operating reserves and cannot 
respond effectively to variations in them. These imperfections severely limit 
the ability of market mechanisms properly to reflect consumer valuations for 
alternative levels of reliability and for investors on the supply and demand 
sides to respond efficiently to them. 
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b. The limited amount of real time demand response in the wholesale market 
leads to spot market demand that is extremely inelastic.  Especially during 
high demand periods as capacity constraints are approached, this creates 
significant opportunities for suppliers to exercise unilateral market power 
leading to supra-competitive prices even with a relatively unconcentrated 
distribution of suppliers.  
 
c. Scarce generating capacity is not price-rationed during true scarcity 
conditions.  Reliance by system operators on “out-of-market” supply-side and 
demand-side resources to manage operating reserves deficiencies leads to spot 
prices for energy and operating reserves that may be too low during these 
conditions.  The costs of these scarcity management tools are not reflected in 
spot market prices and may be spread in charges to consumers over many 
non-reserve deficiency hours through some form of uplift charge. 
 
d. As system operators manage operating reserve deficiencies the reliability of 
the system may deteriorate and “random” blackouts may be necessary.  These 
reductions in effective service quality are generally “shared” across the 
network rather than allocated based on consumer valuations and the associated 
social costs are not accurately reflected in market prices. This creates 
incentives for “free-riding” which in turn leads to underinvestment in 
generating capacity and demand-response programs. 
 
e. Immature, incomplete and illiquid forward markets for risk 
hedging/contracting arrangements undervalue rare events and make it difficult 
for consumers and suppliers to manage long-term risks efficiently.  This in 
turn, reduces the ability of investors in new generating capacity to hedge 
market risks and increases their financing costs above what they would be if 
consumer and supplier risk preferences could be better matched. 
 
f. Ambiguities in retail procurement responsibilities, competitive retail market 
imperfections and regulatory opportunism and uncertainty affects contracting 
incentives and behavior and leads to too much short- term forward contracting 
and too little long term contracting.   This undermines the development of 
liquid forward markets for energy and operating reserves which in turn, 
reduces the ability of investors in new generating capacity to hedge market 
risks and increases their financing costs above what they would be if 
consumer and supplier risk preferences could be better matched. 
 
In theory, these imperfections in spot and forward markets for energy and 
operating reserves could lead to too little or too much investment in generating capacity 
and associated operating reserves. Inelastic demand and market power lead to supra-
 57
competitive prices and to incentives for over-investment in generating capacity.25  The 
other market imperfections generally lead to under-investment in generating capacity and 
demand response programs.  Whether, on balance, the incentives are for too much or to 
little generating capacity is an empirical question. 
Whether it is too much or too little investment also depends in part on other 
institutional arrangements that affect spot market prices and the structure, behavior and 
performance of forward markets.  The institutional arrangements of particular importance  
are:  
 
a. Market power mitigation mechanisms: FERC, along with the market monitors in 
the existing ISOs have imposed a variety of general and locational price 
mitigation measures to respond to potential market power problems in spot 
markets for energy and operating reserves. These mitigation measures include 
general bid caps (e.g. $1000/Mwh) applicable to all prices, location specific bid 
caps (e.g. marginal cost plus 10%), and other bid mitigation and supply obligation 
(must offer) measures.26  Unfortunately, the supply and demand conditions which 
should lead to high spot market prices in a well functioning competitive wholesale 
market (i.e. when there is true competitive “scarcity”) are also the conditions 
when market power problems are likely to be most severe (as capacity constraints 
are approached in the presence of inelastic demand, suppliers’ unilateral 
incentives and ability to increase prices above competitive levels, perhaps by 
creating contrived scarcity, increase).  Accordingly, even the best-designed 
mitigation measures will inevitably “clip” some high prices that truly reflect 
competitive supply scarcity and consumer valuations for energy and reliability as 
they endeavor to constrain high prices that reflect market power.  They may also 
fail to mitigate fully supra-competitive prices during other hours.  FERC’s SMD 
NOPR reflects the judgment that, on balance, these mitigation measures will lead 
to prices that are too low during extreme conditions (e.g. reserve deficiency 
conditions) to attract sufficient investment in peaking capacity and demand 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Green and David (1992), examine the inefficiencies associated with excessive entry 
stimulate by supra-competitive prices resulting from the exercise of market power. 
  
26 The FERC SMD NOPR proposes to require that under certain “non-competitive conditions” (e.g. local 
market power problems caused by congestion) generators be required to offer all available energy (must-
offer requirement) to the system operator subject to a pre-specified bid cap. FERC Docket No. RM01-12-
000, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, July 31, 2002, ¶ 409.  It also invites ITPs to propose additional 
mitigation measures that could apply under certain conditions where market power would be a significant 
problem, id. at ¶ 415.  Finally, the NOPR provides for a regional “safety net bid cap” that would apply to 
the day-ahead and real time markets under all conditions, id. at ¶ 433. 
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response capabilities available during very high demand contingencies to match 
consumer preferences for reliability, though it offers no empirical support for this 
conclusion.   
 
b. Discretionary behavior by ISOs/RTOs/ITPs during true scarcity conditions: The 
level of prices for energy and operating reserves realized during scarcity 
conditions also depend critically on the ways in which system operators respond 
to reserve deficiencies and how these responses are reflected in spot market prices 
for energy and operating reserves.  Small changes in system operators’ behavior 
can have large effects on the “scarcity rents” earned during these hours and, in 
turn, large effects on the profitability of investing in and making available the 
marginal capacity that has traditionally cleared the market under these conditions. 
There are three separate issues effecting investment incentives that emerge here.  
First, as I have already mentioned, to the extent the system operators manage 
reserve deficiencies (true competitive scarcity) using “out-of-market” measures 
that are not reflected in spot market prices, spot market prices will be too low.  
Second, bid mitigation mechanisms are likely to become binding constraints 
during reserve deficiency conditions and may also depress spot market prices too 
much during these conditions.  Third, the mere prospect that the discretionary 
behavior of system operators can have significant effects on the profitability of 
this marginal capacity raises classical opportunism problems.  It is now widely 
recognized that opportunism problems lead to under-investment and that credible 
long-term contracts or vertical integration are efficient institutional responses to 
opportunism problems (Tirole 1988, Joskow 1987).  
 
 
 Empirical Evidence on Net Revenues During Scarcity Conditions 
Exactly how these market and institutional imperfections balance out and affect 
investment incentives is ultimately an empirical question.  This section presents a method 
to calculate the “scarcity rents” that are earned by the marginal generators that just clear 
the market when there is true competitive “scarcity.” I then apply this method to measure 
the scarcity rents produced from spot energy and operating reserve markets operated by 
ISO-New England during the period 1999-2002 (through November 27, 2002).  That is, 
the method measures scarcity rents under conditions where available generating capacity 
must be “rationed” to balance supply and demand and to maintain the network’s 
frequency, voltage and stability targets because available capacity to supply energy and 
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the minimum level of operating reserves pursuant to bilateral contracts and the ISO’s spot 
markets has been exhausted.   
 I focus on the marginal generating capacity that supply energy and operating 
reserves only during “scarcity conditions” and, as a result, have very low capacity factors.  
Generating units that are expected to operate at very low capacity factors typically have 
relatively low fixed costs and relatively high marginal operating costs.  Let CK be the 
annualized fixed cost per Mw-year (including the amortization of investments in this 
capacity where relevant --- see below)) and MCE the marginal operating costs per Mwh 
of the last (highest operating cost) generating unit in the merit order physically capable of  
providing energy or operating reserves.  Let Ps be the average market price of electricity 
during “scarcity hours” and Hs the expected number of scarcity hours per year.  The 
probability that “scarcity” conditions will exist is then given by Hs/8760.  The condition 
for investors in the marginal unit of capacity that runs for Hs hours to just break even 
given any particular probability of scarcity (Hs/8760) is then given by:27  
 
(1)   CK = (Ps - MCE)Hs  = R 
 
where R equals the annual expected scarcity rents that are available to cover the fixed 
costs of the “last unit of capacity” available to supply energy or operating reserves.    
The “optimal” amount of generating capacity should reflect as well the valuation that 
consumers place on reliability and (ultimately) on being curtailed during scarcity 
conditions.  Let V be the average hourly opportunity cost that the marginal consumer 
                                                 
27 This is obviously an oversimplification.  Ps will vary during scarcity hours. 
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incurs by consuming a little less during scarcity conditions, reflecting any associated 
reductions in network quality, the increased likelihood of being curtailed, and actual 
curtailments.28  Then the efficient level of investment will be defined by equating the 
marginal cost of the last unit of generating capacity to the marginal consumers’ expected 
cost of being in scarcity conditions: 
 
(2) CK = Hs*V 
 
If we know V and CK then we could derive the optimal Hs, the optimal probability of 
being in scarcity conditions (Hs/8760) and the optimal quantity of generating capacity 
and demand response capability consistent with this probability.  The higher is V, the 
lower is the optimal Hs and the higher is the optimal amount of reserve capacity (and vice 
versa). 
I now estimate the values for R (and Hs) implied by hourly energy and operating 
reserve prices observed in ISO-New England’s energy and ancillary services markets 
during the four-year period 1999-2002 (through November 27, 2002). The analysis 
assumes that a $1000/Mwh price cap has been in effect during this entire period.29  I 
compare these scarcity rents to alternative measures of CK.  The analysis shows that R 
                                                 
28 For simplicity, this presentation is a little different from the traditional presentation which focus only on 
the cost of lost energy when load is curtailed.  In reality, measuring V is very difficult.  It varies from 
consumer to consumer, with the severity of scarcity conditions, and with the methods used to ration 
demand when curtailments are required.  See generally Stoft 2002, Chapter 2-5. 
 
29 There were five hours in May 2000 when spot energy prices exceeded the cap and the analysis reduces 
those prices to $1000/Mwh.  However, the conclusions that flow from the analysis would not be changed if 
the actual prices realized in these hours had been used instead.  
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has been much lower than CK (defined in a number of different ways) in New England 
over the last four years.   
Many simple discussions of competitive “scarcity conditions” implicitly assume 
that this is the level of supply/demand where the lights will go out if supply is reduced by 
1 Mw.30  In fact, this is not an accurate characterization of how electric power networks 
are operated.  “Scarcity conditions” are triggered when system operators find that they 
have an operating reserve deficiency that cannot be satisfied by buying more energy or 
operating reserves through ordinary organized spot market mechanisms.31  This in turn 
typically triggers the System Operator’s implementation of a set of “operating reserve 
conservation” actions to reduce demand or augment supply using out-of-market 
instruments.  Only as a last resort --- and very infrequently --- has it been necessary to 
implement rolling blackouts with traditional reliability criteria and associated generating 
reserve margins.  The calculations that I present here reflect this “operating reserve 
deficiency” protocol framework.   
First, I identified all hours when the New England ISO declared an operating 
reserve deficiency.  Operating reserve deficiencies trigger NEPOOL Operating Procedure 
4.32  NEPOOL Operating Procedure 4 (Op-4) has 16 action steps of increasing severity.  
                                                 
30 This discussion assumes that market power mitigation mechanisms are successful, that prices for energy 
and operating reserves are competitive, and the market power does not lead to contrived scarcity.  To the 
extent that scarcity conditions reflect the exercise of market power in New England during the period 
studied here, my estimates would overestimate the true competitive scarcity rents produced by the spot 
energy and operating reserve markets in New England under competitive conditions. The same is true for 
the data for PJM and NY described in the previous footnote. 
 
31There is no reason in principal why a system operator should not be able to respond to projected reserve 
deficiencies by making forward (e.g. two-day ahead) commitments if that is a lower cost option.  If system 
operators had the right financial incentives if would make sense to expand their contracting options in this 
way. 
 
32 http://www.iso-ne.com/operating_prodecures/Op4Fin.doc/ . accessed 11/27/02. 
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For example, Action 11 allows 30-minute reserves to go the zero.  Action 12 begins the 
implementation of voltage reductions.   Op-4 (or at least some steps in Op-4) seems to me 
to be a reasonable definition of “scarcity” when we should expect competitive market 
prices to rise far above the marginal operating cost of the last generator physically 
capable of supplying energy and operating reserves. 
 During these scarcity conditions, marginal generators selling in the real time 
energy and ancillary services markets can earn revenues in one of two ways.33  They may 
be called to supply energy and are paid for the energy supplied.  Or they may be 
providing operating reserves and are paid for the operating reserves they supply.  These 
payments are not cumulative at a given point in time.  A generator (or in theory demand) 
is paid for one or the other at any moment in time.  As previously noted, for generators 
supplying energy, the “scarcity rent” is the difference between the price they are paid and 
their marginal supply costs.  For generators supplying operating reserves, the “scarcity 
rent” is no higher than the payment they receive for operating reserves.   As discussed 
above, if energy and operating reserve markets are integrated efficiently, there is also a 
“textbook” relationship between the price of energy and the price of operating reserves 
during scarcity conditions.  Specifically, the price of operating reserves should be roughly 
equal to the price of energy minus the marginal operating cost of the units providing 
operating reserves.  That is, the price of operating reserves is equal to the “opportunity 
cost” incurred by generators supplying operating reserves rather than energy.   
For all Op-4 hours during the period 1999 through November 27, 2002, I obtained 
the price of energy and the price of 10-minute operating reserves.  When the price of 
                                                 
33 Price formation in the real time markets will work its way back into day-ahead and forward contract price 
formation through intertemporal arbitrage. 
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energy exceeded $1000, I set it to the $1000 price cap that was implemented after May 
2000.34  When the price of 10-minute spinning reserves and 10-minute non-spinning 
reserves were different (as was often the case during Op-4 conditions, especially in 
1999), I took the higher of the two prices.  There was only one hour when the operating 
reserve price exceeded $1000 and the price was set to $1000 for that hour.35  To calculate 
the “scarcity rents” associated with supplying energy during Op-4 conditions, I assumed 
that the short-run marginal cost of supplying energy from the marginal generator was 
either $50/Mwh or $100/Mwh (it doesn’t matter much).  This range should bracket the 
true marginal generating costs and any associated start-up, no-load and ramping costs for 
these units given variations in gas prices during this time period.  I took the operating 
reserve revenues without making an adjustment for any operating costs incurred to supply 
operating reserves and, as a result, my method probably slightly overestimates the 
scarcity rents accruing to suppliers of operating reserves during scarcity conditions.    I 
then aggregate the data for each year to calculate values for the “scarcity rents” per Mw-
year available from supplying either energy or operating reserves (or any combination of 
the two) during scarcity conditions. 
The results are reported in Table 10.  The average scarcity rents from supplying 
either energy or operating reserves during OP-4 conditions earned by marginal generators 
is about $10,000/Mw-Year.  The scarcity rents generated from selling energy and 
operating reserves during scarcity conditions (Op-4) are, on average, almost identical (as 
                                                 
34 There are only five hours during this period (in May 2000) that are “trimmed” in this way, but the effect 
on scarcity rents associated with energy supplies (though strangely not operating reserves) is substantial.  
See the footnote to Table 1.  
  
35 The revenue effect is relatively small.  
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theory suggests they should be).36  There is significant volatility from year to year in the 
rents earned, however.  On average there are 46 hours per year when Op-4 is in effect and 
32 hours per year when Op-4 step 11 is in effect.  There is significant volatility in the 
annual number of operating reserve deficiency hours as well.  On average there were only 
six hours per year when the price cap was binding, again with considerable year-to-year 
variation.37  This suggests that the $1000 price caps are unlikely to be the primary source 
of the revenue deficiencies (more on this below).38  There are other factors, at least 
partially related to the reliance on out-of-market instruments to manage reserve 
deficiencies, that are depressing spot prices during reserve deficiency conditions 
associated with the mechanisms used by the system operators to manage reserve 
deficiencies. 
The $10,000/Mw-Yr average value estimated for scarcity rents in New England 
during this period can be compared with the fixed costs (capital amortization and fixed 
O&M) of a new combustion turbine that might be built to provide the systems “reserve 
capacity.”  This cost would be roughly $60,000 - $80,000/Mw-Yr in New England.  
Clearly, the scarcity rents are far below what would be necessary to attract CT to the 
market to be available to supply operating reserves and energy only during scarcity 
conditions. 
                                                 
36 However, the relationship between energy prices and operating reserve prices on an hourly basis vary 
from theoretical predictions, especially in 1999 when the operating reserve prices are often very strange. 
 
37 One must wonder if 1999 is just an unusual year, with the ISO and market participants learning how to 
operate within the new wholesale market institutions in New England.  There are many more Op-4 hours 
than in other years, but only one hour when the energy price exceeded $1000/Mwh (and as I understand it 
no price caps were in effect).  The scarcity rents are much higher than in other years. 
 
38A similar analysis has been done for the New York ISO and comes to similar conclusions.  See  Patton 
(2002), pp. 25, 42-64. Patton’s analysis of the New York ISO suggests that the reliance on out-of-market 
mechanisms and associated discretionary behavior by the New York ISO during reserve deficiency hours 
plays a much more important role than do the price caps. 
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One might argue that this is the wrong comparison, since there are many other 
hours when these generators can earn scarcity rents.  If this were true then the 
$10,000/Mw/Yr value is an underestimate of the true quasi-rents available to cover 
capital costs.  However, I have examined all hours when the market price for energy 
exceeded $100/Mwh during this period and find that about 80% of the scarcity rents are 
earned during Op-4 conditions.   
Another possible objection to this comparison would be that the total costs of a 
new CT is not the relevant benchmark for New England.  Because New England has a lot 
of old conventional oil, gas and coal fueled steam-turbine generating capacity, the market 
clearing prices reflect their relatively high heat rates (say 11,000 Btu/kWh) during many 
hours of the year.  CCGTs with much lower heat rates (say 7500 Btu/kWh) are attracted 
to the market and earn rents to cover their capital costs on the “spark spread” associated 
with the difference between their heat rates and the heat rates of the generators that clear 
the market, as well as from the scarcity rents I have identified.  Under this scenario, 
CCGTs are inframarginal, but push older conventional steam plants higher up in the merit 
order.  These old plants then can provide operating reserves during tight supply 
situations.  In this case, the scarcity rents identified must be high enough to cover the 
fixed-O&M costs of the existing generators that will provide this reserve capacity so that 
they find it profitable to stay open and available to provide operating reserves.  I am told 
that the annual fixed O&Ms of an older fossil steam units is in the range of $20,000 to 
$35,000/Mw/Yr.39  The scarcity rents that I have measured for New England are not high 
                                                 
39 These older plants also typically face costly environmental mitigation obligations if they continue to 
operate and these costs should be factored in as well. 
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enough to compensate for these annual fixed costs either and absent an additional source 
of revenues these plants would simply be mothballed or retired permanently. 
A third objection could be that the system is too reliable and that the shortfall in 
spot market revenues reflects excess capacity relative to consumer valuations of 
consuming more or less on the marginal during scarcity conditions.  Resolving this 
question requires making assumptions about the appropriate value for V, a number that is 
very difficult to measure.40  We can obtain some insight into this explanation by solving 
for the implied value of V in equation (2) above. If Ck is $60,000/Mw-year and Hs is 46 
hours, then the implied value of V in equation (2) is about $1,300 per Mwh.  If Ck is 
$30,000/Mw-year, the implied value of V is about $650/Mwh.   If we focus instead on 
the Op-4 Action 11 hours (32 hours on average) then the implied values of V are $1,875/ 
Mwh and $937/Mwh respectively.  While these implied values for V are below the 
limited number of estimates of the value of lost energy used in other countries (e.g. 
England and Wales during the 1990s, Australia today) to set price caps, the numbers are 
not directly comparable. Recall that V in equation (2) is defined as the marginal 
consumer’s opportunity cost of consuming more or less averaged over all reserve 
deficiency hours and not just during the tiny number of hours when load is actually 
curtailed.41  We would expect the implied value of V as defined here to be below the 
value consumers place on consuming more or less energy during the very small number 
of hours they are actually subject to significant curtailments.  Accordingly, the implied 
                                                 
40 Steven Stoft, op. cit., Chapter 2-5. 
 
41 Australia now uses a value of lost load of about $5,800/Mwh ($AU 10,000/Mwh).  The value of V as 
defined here should be lower since it is an average value for all reserve deficiency hours.   
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values of V as defined here and the prevailing levels of reliability do not seem to be out 
of line with the limited evidence on consumer valuations. 
The conclusion that I draw from this analysis is that the spot hourly energy and 
ancillary services markets in New England have not provided scarcity rents that are 
nearly sufficient to make it profitable for reserve “peaking” capacity to enter the market 
through new investment or to continue operating consistent with conventional levels of 
reliability.  These results are consistent with those contained in related studies done for 
PJM and the New York ISO.  Whether or not there is too much or too little reliability is a 
more difficult question to answer definitively.  However, these calculations reinforce the 
conclusions in the FERC SMD that spot energy and operating reserve markets alone are 
unlikely to provide adequate incentives to bring forth enough generating capacity to 
maintain traditional reliability levels. 42, 43  While there appears to be abundant generating 
capacity in most regions of the country at the present time, this is a potential problem that 
                                                 
42 Data available from the PJM Market Monitor’s annual “State of the Market” report provides information 
that can help us to define an upper bound on the measure of scarcity rents that I have produced for New 
England.  These PJM reports calculate the net revenues earned from spot energy sales for units with 
different marginal supply costs.  The values calculated for units with marginal costs greater than $50 and 
$100 respectively are upper bounds for the values that would emerge by applying the same methods to PJM 
as I applied to New England.  They are upper bounds, because they include all hours during each year and 
not just scarcity hours and reflect rents earned in other hours when there may be some market power. It is 
evident that the energy market rents for high heat-rate units appear to be much higher in PJM than in ISO-
NE.  Nevertheless, even in this case, the average rents earned from the energy market are roughly 50% of 
the PJM target effective annualized capacity cost of about $63,000/Mw-year.   
 
43 Of course, New England, New York and PJM have had capacity obligations and owners of generating 
capacity can receive an additional stream of revenues from sales of capacity. And there is no shortage of 
generating capacity in New England, PJM or New York (except in New York City where investment in 
new generating capacity faces additional challenges) and in most other regions of the country.   In addition, 
as I have already discussed, the New England market frequently is cleared on the margin with generation 
from the large quantity of existing older oil/gas/coal fueled generating capacity with relatively high heat 
rates.  CCGT capacity coming into the market could earn net revenues to cover capital costs during many 
“non-scarcity” hours from the spark-spread representing the difference between the heat rate of the old 
steam units that clear the market and define the competitive spot market price and the lower heat rates of 
the CCGTs.  Accordingly, CCGT capacity expands more quickly than demand grows, the older steam 
capacity will be pushed higher up in the merit order and can contribute to reliability as long as these units 
can earn enough in scarcity rents to cover their fixed O&M costs and the costs of required environmental 
mitigation investments. 
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may undermine future investment and lead to premature retirement of some existing 
generating  capacity. 
 
TRANSMISSION GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT  
 
 I do not want to conclude this paper without at least a few comments about 
transmission governance and investment issues.  Transmission networks provide the 
essential supporting platform upon which competitive wholesale markets depend.  
Transmission congestion effectively reduces the geographic expanse of competition,  
increases the incidence of locational market power, and can limit entry of competing 
generators.  A well functioning transmission network is a critical component of a 
program to create robust competitive wholesale and retail markets for electricity.  Yet the 
legacy transmission network that we inherit from the era of large numbers of vertically 
integrated regulated firms was not designed to promote competition among generators 
over large geographic areas, focused on interconnecting generators and loads within 
individual utility control areas and did not take local market power and other market 
performance problems into account when investments were made.  It should come as no 
surprise that the legacy network is not well suited for supporting competitive wholesale 
markets and that significant investments will be required to adapt the legacy network to 
its new role. 
As I have already discussed, many countries that have implemented competitive 
electricity market programs have created independent regional or national transmission 
companies with responsibilities for system operations (broadly defined) and transmission 
investment.  In the U.S., we have taken a different approach.  Most transmission assets 
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are owned, operated and maintained by vertically integrated utilities.  There is very 
significant geographic balkanization of ownership and operation with many companies 
owning, operating, maintaining and potentially responsible for investing in new 
transmission facilities at particular locations on the same AC network.   
Rather than promoting vertical and horizontal restructuring of asset ownership 
and operation to deal with these independence and balkanization issues, FERC has taken 
the existing ownership structure as a constraint and promoted the creation of new not-for-
profit independent system operators (ISO) or Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) to 
deal with these issues.  RTOs are to be responsible for scheduling and dispatching 
generators on regional networks, implementing market-based mechanisms for allocating 
scarce transmission capacity, monitoring generator, marketer, transmission owner 
behavior and market performance, coordinating maintenance performed by transmission 
owners, coordinating regional planning processes for new transmission facilities, and 
operating voluntary public spot markets (real time and day-ahead) for energy and 
ancillary services.  However, these independent entities own no transmission assets, have 
no linemen or helicopters to maintain transmission lines and respond to outages, and are 
not directly responsible for the costs of operating, investing in, or the ultimate 
performance of the transmission networks they “manage.”    
These organizational arrangements are further complicated by the distribution of 
regulatory authority and responsibilities between state and federal regulators.  The states 
are responsible for reviewing applications for major new transmission facilities and 
granting any necessary permits.  FERC has been responsible for regulating the prices for 
unbundled (wholesale) transmission service, but has no authority over transmission 
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planning or siting approvals, while the states are responsible for regulating charges for 
bundled transmission service charged by vertically integrated companies to their retail 
customers, though exactly the same facilities and people are involved in both.  The FERC 
SMD endeavors to extend FERC’s jurisdiction over charges for all transmission service, 
but whether states can be forced to pass along these FERC approved charges in retail 
prices is a matter of dispute.44  Until recently, FERC’s policies on transmission 
investment responsibilities and cost recovery rules have been confusing and, in my view 
much too heavily focused on flawed models that rely primarily on merchant transmission 
investment (Joskow and Tirole 2003). Moreover, FERC has not embraced any program to 
adopt performance-based regulatory mechanisms focused on improving transmission 
network performance and reducing costs. Very recently, FERC has begun to use its 
ratemaking authority to reward transmission owners that divest their transmission assets, 
that form independent transmission companies, that operate under the supervision of 
RTOs, and to improve network performance.45  This is a step in the right direction, and 
since these policies were adopted, there has been growing interest in transmission 
divestiture and the formation in independent transmission companies (ITC).46  However, 
there is much work to be done. 
Current institutional arrangements governing transmission operations and 
investment are simply not well matched to creating the transmission network platform 
                                                 
44 It seems fairly clear that FERC does have this authority if it chooses to assert it.  However, in a White 
Paper issued on April 28, 2003 FERC has announced that it will not assert this jurisdiction and allow the 
states to determine prices for “bundled” retail transmission service.  
 
45 Proposed Pricing Policy for Efficient Operation and Expansion of the Transmission Grid, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission Docket Number PL-03-1-000, Issued January 13, 2003. 
 
46 My views on FERC’s transmission regulatory policies can be found in my Comments submitted in 
response to FERC’s SMD NOPR. http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pjoskow/papers.htm.  
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necessary to support well functioning competitive markets that can operate with a 
minimal amount of continuing regulatory “mitigation” measures to respond to market 
power and related market performance concerns.  Stimulating transmission investment 
has been especially problematic.  While generation investment in generating capacity 
grew enormously during the last five years, transmission investment has been declining 
for many years (U.S. Department of Energy 2002).  Transmission congestion has grown 
steadily over the last several years.  Figure 10 displays the moving average of the number 
of monthly administrative Transmission Line Reliefs (TLRs) ordered by regional security 
coordinators to respond to transmission constraints, primarily in the Midwest.  Between 
June 1998 and December 2002, the number of monthly TLRs has increased by a factor of 
6.  In New England, new generating capacity that has been built in Maine and Rhode 
Island cannot be run to meet regional energy needs economically because there is 
inadequate transmission to get it out of these areas.  At the same time, Southern 
Connecticut faces reliability problems because of transmission constraints that 
significantly limit imports into that part of New England.  These trends in transmission 
congestion are not limited to areas that have not implemented Locational Marginal 
Pricing (LMP).  Table 11 displays the number of hours of transmission congestion on the 
PJM system from 1998 to 2002, the first ISO to implement an LMP system.47  Table 12 
displays congestion charges in PJM between 1999 and 2002.  By both measures 
congestion has continued to grow rapidly in PJM.    
 It is often argued that the primary problem causing the decline in transmission 
investment is local “Nimby” opposition to new transmission lines.  This is certainly a 
                                                 
47 The 2002 data include the incorporation of PJM-West into PJM and are not directly comparable to the 
data for previous years. 
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problem.  However, many transmission investment opportunities do not involve opening 
up major new transmission corridors or significantly expanding the footprint of the 
transmission network.  There are many potential opportunities to increase the capacity of 
transmission networks other than by building major new lines involving new rights of 
way and expansion of the network’s footprint.  They vary from no- or low-cost upgrades 
of the reliability of breakers and other components on the network, better monitoring, 
communication and control capabilities, to more costly investments in static var 
compensators, capacitors, substation enhancements, and reconductoring of existing 
transmission lines.  These types of investment opportunities are typically intertwined with 
and inseparable from the incumbent TOs’ transmission networks from a physical, 
maintenance and operating perspective.   
 This characterization of the diverse attributes of the full range of transmission 
investment opportunities is consistent with the 33 priority projects identified in ISO New 
England’s recently released 2002 Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.48  Of these 33 
projects, 29 are projected to cost less than $20 million each and have some or all of the 
attributes I have just listed.  Another project has a cost of $40 million.  Indeed, all 
together these 30 projects account for only $163 million of the $888 million estimated 
total cost of the entire 33 project program.  That is, three projects account for the bulk of 
the costs.  All three projects (all of which have been designated as reliability projects) 
involve significant enhancements to the existing network, while two of them also 
anticipate building new 345 KV loops.  Few if any of these 33 real transmission projects 
are well represented by an economic model that assumes that transmission investment 
involves building “stand-alone” transmission lines on new corridors from point A to point 
                                                 
48 ISO New England, 2002 Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP02), November 7, 2002. 
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B that require simple interconnections with the existing network at each end.  There may 
very well be some projects with these attributes, but they are not representative of the full 
range of transmission investment opportunities and are the ones that are most likely to 
run into siting problems by expanding the network’s footprint.  
  FERC has also adopted an excessively narrow conceptualization of “congestion 
management” that has led to its failure properly to consider important organizational, 
management and incentive issues affecting both transmission operation and transmission 
investment. I think of “managing congestion” as encompassing all actions that can be 
taken by system operators and transmission owners that can affect congestion and 
associated congestion costs.  Congestion management actions properly encompass 
maintenance decisions and expenditures, physical operating decisions that are still made 
(or should be made) by transmission owners, and investments, small and large, in the 
transmission network.  An ISO or RTO like PJM running a security-constrained dispatch, 
resulting in a set of ex post LMPs is not in a position to undertake this broader set of 
transmission network management actions.  It does not have the people, the trucks, the 
materials, the money, or at the present time, the financial incentives to do it.  Instead, 
what an ISO does on a day-to-day basis is to take into account the transmission capacity 
that is available and, using the bids made by generators and demand response, then 
calculates the most efficient way to allocate the transmission capacity that is available.  
Contrary to the frequent references made in recent FERC rulemakings, LMPs themselves 
do not “manage congestion” in any meaningful way.  The ISO’s security constrained 
dispatch allocates scarce transmission capacity based on the bids submitted by competing 
users of the network, supply and demand conditions, and available transmission capacity. 
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The LMPs themselves merely provide ex post measures of congestion on the system 
given the transmission capacity available, the price and quantity bids made at different 
locations, and the security criteria specified by the ITP and included in its central 
economic dispatch program.  Few, if any consumers actually see LMPs, so there is little 
if any response to them on the demand side either. 
While an efficient security constrained dispatch that results in an efficient 
utilization of a given quantity of scarce transmission capacity is an important part of a 
comprehensive congestion management system, there are other important aspects of 
congestion management that need to be taken into account by policy makers.  The 
experience in England and Wales over the last decade indicates that substantial 
transmission investment, operating performance improvements, reductions in congestion 
and ancillary services costs, and lower overall transmission costs can be achieved with 
the right organizational and regulatory incentive institutions in place.  This is a goal that 
electricity policymakers in the U.S. need to place higher on the restructuring and 
regulatory reform agenda.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The development of well-functioning competitive wholesale and retail markets 
for electricity in the U.S. is a work in progress.  It has encountered more problems and 
proceeded less quickly than some had anticipated when the first restructuring and 
competition programs were first being implemented in the late 1990s.  The most visible 
success of these initiatives to date has been the substantial investment in new generating 
capacity completed by merchant generating companies in the last few years, and the 
shifting of the associated construction cost, operating performance and market risks to 
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suppliers rather than to consumers as under regulation.  There has also been substantial 
growth in the fraction of electricity supplied through competitive wholesale market 
transactions (physical and financial) as a result of restructuring of incumbent vertically 
integrated utilities, the entry of new generating capacity built by merchant generating 
companies, and the development of public and private wholesale power trading 
institutions. Load-serving entities in all parts of the country rely more on competitive 
wholesale market purchases to supplement or replace owned-generation subject to cost-
based regulation than they did in the mid-1990s. Despite their imperfections, Order 888 
and FERC initiatives that have built on it have substantially increased access to 
transmission networks and associated support services, facilitating these wholesale 
market developments. We have learned a lot about the performance attributes of 
alternative wholesale market institutions from recent experience. Reforms aimed at 
adopting best practices are being implemented in many regions of the country with strong 
support and encouragement by FERC. Retail customers in a number of states have 
benefited from lower regulated retail prices negotiated as a component of state 
restructuring programs, though the direct benefits attributable to retail competition per se 
have been limited and have flowed primarily to the largest electricity customers. 
 The transition to competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets has also 
been plagued by problems and disappointments.  The boom in merchant generating 
investment and the growth in wholesale power trade has now turned into a bust.  Many 
merchant generating and trading companies are in serious financial trouble and cannot 
raise capital to build or acquire projects.  Many generating projects under construction 
and development have been cancelled.  While a significant reduction in investment in 
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new generating capacity should have been expected due to basic supply and demand 
fundamentals, the financial problems faced by this sector reflect a number of other 
market and regulatory phenomena.  It is fairly clear that the next generation of merchant 
investment activity will take place in an environment where capital is much more costly 
than it was during the late 1990s bubble and where lenders will be looking for supporting 
portfolios of supply contracts of longer durations.  Investors will also be looking for 
much more stability in wholesale market rules, reforms in wholesale market institutions 
to support investment or continued operation of peaking capacity, more efficient and 
transparent congestion management arrangements, and stable federal regulatory policies. 
Many wholesale trading companies have either completely or substantially withdrawn 
from trading activity beyond trading around their own generating assets and market 
liquidity has fallen dramatically, reducing the efficiency of short-term markets and 
making it very difficult for buyers’ and sellers’ risk preferences to be well-matched in 
liquid markets for longer-term forward markets.  Market power problems and other 
market imperfections have reduced the efficiency of wholesale power markets and 
increased costs to consumers.   
In California, the combination of market design imperfections, market power 
problems, and poor federal and state policy responses has managed both to increase retail 
prices enormously (30% to 40%) and to leave the utility and merchant generating sectors 
littered with financially crippled and bankrupt suppliers.  The performance of retail 
competition programs has been disappointing almost everywhere, especially for 
residential and small commercial customers.  Imperfections in retail competition 
 77
programs investments in new generating capacity and undermine the performance of 
wholesale spot markets as well.  
Investment in transmission capacity has stagnated while network congestion has 
increased.  This in turn has increased local market power problems and complicated the 
smooth operation of wholesale power markets.  Many parts of the country continue to 
rely on inefficient non-price rationing mechanisms to manage congestion and property 
rights to scarce transmission capacity continue to be poorly defined. The transmission 
system remains fragmented with too many system operators relying on incompatible 
scheduling, transmission pricing, and emergency management mechanisms.  The bulk of 
the transmission capacity is owned by companies that also own and operate generating 
facilities connected to these transmission facilities and trade power in the same regional 
markets, creating opportunities to increase rivals’ costs and reduce competition. FERC 
has responded to the failure to restructure the industry to match the needs of competitive 
electricity markets with new institutional arrangements (ISO, RTO) that may be well 
suited for operating public markets for energy and ancillary services and real time 
physical system dispatch, but whose long run performance attributes from the broader 
perspective of transmission network operating costs, transmission line availability, and 
transmission  investment are not particularly promising. 
 The positions that the various states have taken regarding electricity sector 
reforms in general, and FERC’s SMD in particular, reflect their assessment of the costs 
and benefits of the electricity competition and restructuring initiatives to date.  The states 
in the Northeast, Texas, and a few states in the Midwest that have gone the farthest down 
the restructuring path are committed to making these initiatives work better and to 
 78
implement the wholesale and retail market reforms necessary to do so.  They have gone 
too far to easily reverse course and return to the old system of regulated vertically 
integrated firms.  Their strategies and the basic framework established in the FERC SMD 
seem to be reasonably well aligned.  California remains in shock from the experiences of 
2000 and 2001 and its long run electricity strategy remains murky at best.  The majority 
of the states, clustered in the Southeast, the South, and the West have either taken a 
cautious wait and see attitude or have simply rejected restructuring and competition 
initiatives.  These states tend to have relatively low regulated retail prices, do not face 
looming supply shortages or reliability problems and face little consumer pressure for 
change. Why take the risk that a California-like crisis will come home to roost?  Since 
restructuring to rely on wholesale and retail electricity markets involves turning much 
more of the electricity value chain over to federal from state jurisdiction, these states are 
also concerned that FERC will not act promptly or responsibly to protect consumers in 
their states when problems arise.  (Texas (or at least ERCOT) is the only state that has 
been in a position to implement fundamental reforms while retaining state jurisdiction of 
the reform process.)  
If the states that have not embraced competitive market reforms move forward 
voluntarily in the future it will be because the other states that have committed to 
restructuring, wholesale and retail competition can demonstrate to them that it has in 
practice, rather than just in theory, brought long-term benefits to consumers.   This will 
require solid empirical analysis of the performance of the electric power sectors in those 
states that have restructured and implemented comprehensive wholesale and retail 
competition programs.         
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TABLE 1 
 
GENERATING PLANT SALES AND TRANSFERS 
MW 
 
 
YEAR   DIVESTED  TO UNREGULATED TOTAL 
             AFFILIATES 
 
 
1998   23,413      -0-   23,413 
 
1999   50,962      4,108   55,070 
 
2000   15,334    32,657   47,991 
 
2001     8,135    20,051   28,186 
 
2002     2,154    27,206   29,360 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Electric Power Monthly, various issues 1998-2003, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 
TABLE 2 
 
GENERATING CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
MW 
 
 
 
 
YEAR    GENERATING CAPACITY ADDED 
 
19971        4,000 
 
19982        6,500 
 
19993      10,500 
 
20004      23,500 
 
20015      48,000 
 
20026      55,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Inventory of Power Plants:1997, Energy Information Administration 
2 Inventory of Power Plants:1998, Energy Information Administration 
3 Electric Power Annual:1999, Energy Information Administration 
4 Electric Power Annual:2000, Energy Information Administration 
5 Energy Information Administration website, read February 15, 2003 
6 Energy Argus New Power Plant Spreadsheet, February, 2003 
TABLE 3 
 
NON-UTILITY POWER PRODUCTION 
% Of Total Electricity Supplied 
 
 
 
YEAR   % Non-Utility 
 
1990      7.2% 
 
1991      8.0% 
 
1992      9.3%  
 
1993      9.8% 
 
1994    10.5%   
 
1995    10.8% 
 
1996    10.7% 
 
1997    10.6% 
 
1998    11.2% 
 
1999    14.3% 
 
2000    20.7% 
 
2001    30.0% 
 
2002 33.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Monthly Energy Review, U.S. Energy Information Administration, March 2003, 
page 97 
 
TABLE 4 
 
SHARE PRICES OF SELECTED MERCHANT GENERATING AND TRADING 
FIRMS 
($/share) 
 
 
 
Company  May 2001 Peak Week        March 10, 2003  
Share Price  S&P Credit Rating 
 
AES         48.5     3.2  B+ 
 
AEP    50.4    21.2  BBB 
 
Allegheny   53.8     5.1  BB- 
 
Calpine   54.7     6.1  BB 
 
Dynegy   57.0     2.2  B 
 
Duke    46.1    12.2  BBB7 
 
El Paso   64.9     4.4  B+ 
 
Mirant   45.4     1.4  BB 
 
NRG    30.4     6.2  D 
 
Reliant   33.8     3.7  B- 
 
Williams   41.0     4.0  B+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Yahoo Finance and S&P web site, accessed March 10, 2003 
                                                 
7 Duke Energy Trading and Marketing 
 
TABLE 5 
 
RETAIL CHOICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
December 2002 
 
 
 
Retail Choice Began:   March 1998 
 
 
Fraction of Customers Served By ESP: 
 
 Residential:    2.6% 
 Small C/I:    8.8% 
 Medium C/I:  11.1% 
 Large C/I:  29.2% 
 
 Total:     3.4% 
 
 
Fraction of Load Served By ESPs: 
 
 Residential:    2.4% 
 Small C/I:  11.5% 
 Medium C/I:  17.3% 
 Large C/I:  46.2% 
 
 Total:   22.2% 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.state.ma.us/doer/pub_info/migrate.htm 
 
TABLE 6 
 
RETAIL CHOICE IN NEW YORK 
As of December 2002 
 
 
Retail Choice Began:  May 1998-July 2001 
 
 
Fraction of Customers Served by ESP: 
 
Residential:   5.0%    
 
Non-Residential:  7.1% 
 
 
Fraction of Load Served by ESP: 
 
Residential:   5.6% 
 
Non-residential:  32.3% 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.dps.state.ny.us/Electric_RA_Migration.htm 
 
 
TABLE 7 
 
RETAIL CHOICE IN MAINE 
 (Central Maine Power) 
 
January 2003 
 
 
 
Retail Choice Began:  March, 2000 
 
 
Fraction of Load Served by ESP: 
 
 Residential/Small Commercial: <1% 
 Medium Industrial:   28% 
 Large Industrial:   73% 
 Total:     33%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:    
http://www.state.me.us/mpuc/electric%20restructuring/migrationrates.htm 
   
TABLE 8 
 
RETAIL CHOICE IN NEW JERSEY 
As of December 15, 2002 
 
 
Retail Choice Began:  November 1999 
 
Fraction of Customers Served By ESPs: 
 
Residential:  0.06% 
 
Non-Residential: 0.14% 
 
 
Fraction of Retail Load Served by ESPs:  1.9% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.bpu.state.nj.us/wwwroot/energy/elecswitchdata.htm 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 
 
RETAIL CHOICE IN OHIO 
September 30, 2002 
 
Retail Choice Began: January 1, 2001 
 
Fraction of Customers Served by ESP: 
 
 AEP Subsidiaries: 
 
  Columbus Southern: 
 
   Residential:  0.00% 
   Commercial:  0.25% 
   Industrial:  0.00% 
 
  Ohio Power: 
 
   Residential:  0.00% 
   Commercial:  0.00% 
   Industrial:  0.00% 
 
 First Energy Subsidiaries: 
 
  Cleveland Electric: 
 
   Residential:  55.05% 
   Commercial:  54.84% 
   Industrial:  27.69% 
 
  Ohio Edison: 
 
   Residential:  23.85% 
   Commercial:  23.51 
   Industrial:  27.70% 
 
 Dayton Power and Light: 
 
   Residential:  0.00% 
   Commercial:  0.01% 
   Industrial:  0.16% 
 
Source: 
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/ohioutil/MarketMonitoring/ECC_Switch_Rates_Summar
y 
TABLE 10 
 
SCARCITY RENTS IN ISO-NEW ENGLAND8 
 
Year  OP-4 Rents  Op-4 Rents  Op-4 Rents Op-4 Hours Op-4 Hours Price Cap   
  Energy   Energy  Operating         Binding  
MC = $50  MC =$100  Reserves      All     Step 11 Hours  
($/Mw-Year)  ($/Mw-Year)  ($/Mw-Year) 
 
2002  $  5,070  $  4,153  $  4,723      21       21      3  
 
2001  $15,818  $14,147  $11,411      41       37    15 
 
20009  $  6,528  $  4,241  $  4,894      25       14      5   
 
1999  $18,874  $14,741  $19,839      98       55      1 
 
Average $11,573  $ 9,574  $10,217      46       32       6   
 
 
                                                 
8 Computation procedures are discussed in the text. 
 
9 There were five hours where energy prices exceeded the $1000 price cap in May 2000 before the caps were imposed.  For four of these hours the average price 
was $6,000/Mwh.  If we include the actual revenues earned during these five hours rather then capping them at $1000 the values for 2000 $/Mw/Yr would be 
$28,349 (MC = $50/Mwh) and $27,362 (MC=100).  There was only one hour when operating reserve prices exceeded the $1000 price cap.  The operating 
reserves revenues were $7,294/Mw/Yr in 2000 without imposing the $1000/Mwh cap.    
TABLE 11 
 
PJM CONGESTION EVENT HOURS 
 
 
 
YEAR  TOTAL 500KV 345KV 230KV 
 
1998  1,244  203  71  588 
 
1999  2,134  189  148  818 
 
2000  6,941  562   14  869 
 
2001  8,435  759   38  744 
 
2002  11,657  1,926  1,107  2,056 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  PJM State of the Market Report 2002. 
TABLE 12 
 
PJM CONGESTION CHARGES 
($million) 
 
 
1999   $53 
 
2000   $132 
 
2001   $271 
 
2002 $430 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  PJM State of the Market Report 2002 
 
FIGURE 1
Real Retail Price of Electricity ($1996):1960-2001
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Figure 3A
PENNSYLVANIA DIRECT ACCESS LOAD: INDUSTRIAL (%)
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Figure 3B
PENNSYLVANIA DIRECT ACCESS LOAD: RESIDENTIAL (%)
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FIGURE 4A 
RETAIL CHOICE IN TEXAS 
December 31, 2002 
 
Retail Choice Began: January 1, 2002 
(Data include customers in 2001 Pilots)    
     
   
Source: Public Utility Commission of Texas, February 2003 Report Card on Competition 
 
FIGURE 4B 
RETAIL CHOICE IN TEXAS 
December 31, 2002 
 
 
 
Source: Public Utility Commission of Texas, February 2003 Report Card on Competition 
FIGURE 4C 
RETAIL CHOICE IN TEXAS 
December 31, 2002 
 
 
Source: Public Utility Commission of Texas, February 2003 Report Card on Competition 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
Source:  Public Utility Commission of Texas
Figure 6
AVERAGE RESIDENTIAL PRICE (cents/Kwh Nominal)
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Figure 7
% Change in Residential Retail Price (1995-2002)
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Figure 8
PERFECTLY COMPETITIVBE 
WHOLESALE SPOT ELECTRICITY MARKET
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Figure 9
RATIONING SCARCE CAPACITY
Dp
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R
Additional “scarcity rents” help pay
capital costs of all units and are especially
important for “reserves” that run infrequently
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Figure 10
Transmission Line Relief Loadings (TLR)
 12-Month Moving Average
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Source: North American Electric Reliability Counsil (NERC)
